



Ex-post evaluation of the Schengen part of the temporary Cash-flow and Schengen Facility 2007-2009 for Bulgaria and Romania

Case studies - Romania

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This document contains the Romanian case studies developed to support the ex-post evaluation of the of the Schengen part of the temporary Cash-flow and Schengen Facility 2007-2009 for Bulgaria and Romania.

Abbreviation/term	Definition
<i>APIS</i>	Advance Passenger Information System
<i>ATM</i>	Asynchronous Transfer Mode
<i>AWP</i>	Automated Working Posts
<i>Blue border</i>	Sea and river borders outside the border crossing points
<i>BCP</i>	Border crossing points
<i>MATRA</i>	Bulgarian-Dutch cooperation program – the Social Transformation Programme
<i>CSD</i>	Center for the Study of Democracy
<i>DVCN</i>	Data/Voice Integrated Communications Network
<i>EBRD</i>	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
<i>EUROSUR</i>	European Border Surveillance System
<i>EC</i>	European Commission
<i>Europol</i>	European Police Office - EU law enforcement agency facilitating the exchange of criminal intelligence between police, customs and security services
<i>ERDF</i>	European Regional Development Fund
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>FRA</i>	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
<i>EBF</i>	External Border Fund
<i>FADO</i>	False and Authentic Documents Online
<i>Frontex</i>	Frontières extérieures - European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
<i>Green borders</i>	Land borders outside of border crossing points
<i>Hard interventions</i>	Investments in infrastructures (i.e. buildings, border control checkpoints, helicopters)
<i>IBRD</i>	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
<i>MCV</i>	Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification
<i>MAI</i>	Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romania
<i>MIAR</i>	Ministry of Internal Affairs Romania
<i>NISA</i>	National IT System for Alerts
<i>N-SIS</i>	National Schengen Information System

Case study Methodology

Selection criteria

Romania

The selection of cases for Romania aims to cover a balanced number of important projects covering objectives 1 and 2. The cumulative value of the selected contracts is 76% of the total amount of the Schengen Facility for Romania. The selected cases cover a broad variety of measures: acquisition of river and maritime vessels and land vehicles, modernization of BCPs, acquisition of surveillance equipment, upgrading of communication systems (TETRA and NISA), and implementation of N.SIS II.

Data collection

Data collection has included the following elements:

- 1) Document and background review
- 2) Familiarisation interviews
- 3) In-depth interviews
- 4) Survey questionnaires
- 5) Site visits

Document and background review has included the sources indicated in the Terms of Reference and other relevant legislation, indicative programmes, statistical and administrative data gathered by the Commission services, Eurostat, Frontex and Member States (such as programme monitoring data, statistics on irregular border crossings etc.), interim and comprehensive reports, audit reports, reports on monitoring activities carried out by the Commission services and surveys of or interviews with the Responsible Authorities, the intermediate bodies, beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders.

Further to this basic information, for each case study additional specific background literature has been reviewed in order to better understand the technical and operational context. For instance, in relation to air and naval surveillance case-studies there are various reports and analyses that helped to understand better the modalities and policy context of the use of naval and air surveillance technologies.

Familiarisation interviews have been carried out in order to better understand:

- technical aspects related to the case studies,
- determine the types of indicator-related information that may be available and requested
- determine the types of interviews that should be approached for each case study

In-depth interviews: the initial set of in-depth interviews has been carried out with all relevant officers at Ministry/national HQ level with the purpose of:

- agreeing on the indicator-information and documentation provided by the authorities,
- agreeing on the interviewees available for interviews
- agreeing on the locations of the site visits and access to equipment

The interviewees approached for these case studies include representatives from the directorates responsible for the Schengen Facility (Schengen Directorate in Romania

and the International Projects Directorate in Bulgaria), Border Police, IT and communications units of the two countries. The interviewees have been recruited among the following three groups:

- Senior strategic level policy makers / Border Police officials able to respond to general and strategic level questions;
- Senior public servants responsible for implementation (contracting, payment, certification, developing specifications, overseeing implementation, etc.);
- Ultimate beneficiaries: via site-visits we have made an effort to reach respondents who are directly benefiting from the equipment and systems acquired through the SF either at the BCP, 'blue' and 'green' border, or at central / regional headquarters.

Survey questionnaires and site visits have been the two data-collection instruments which we have used to gather stakeholder opinions related to the case studies. They have been also used as a form of validation of information obtained via the document review and in-depth interviews with policy stakeholders.

The survey (questionnaires) has been used in four of the Romanian case studies and in one of the Bulgarian case studies. The survey questionnaires have been distributed to current BP officers and have been used for cases RO1, cases RO3, RO4, RO5 and BG4. Questionnaires have been prepared in Romanian and Bulgarian and have focused on evaluation of sustainability and impact of the respective measures (themes 5 and 6 of the evaluation questions). More specifically the surveys have been used to collect opinions on the following case studies:

- RO1 - in regards to the purchase of 1226 terrestrial vehicles);
- RO2 – Modernisation, reconfiguration, and construction of 31 facilities for the Romanian Border Guard
- RO3 - Specialised detection equipment used by officers at BCPs / green border
- RO7 – Rehabilitation of Romanian Consular Offices
- BG4 - Use of TETRA communication devices by Border Police officers in Bulgaria.

For each of these categories a separate set of questions has been designed. The respondents have been presented with multiple choice questions with scales, allowing them to indicate and comment on:

- The appropriateness of the investment / equipment purchased
- The level of training received
- The impact on work (time-saving, effectiveness)
- The quality of maintenance / service

The sample of respondents has been drawn from end users of the equipment obtained through the Schengen Facility. Respondents have been explicitly instructed to focus on this specific equipment when answering the questionnaires.

Site visits: Due to the large number of contracts and locations involved in all cases, site visits have been primarily used to get some additional insight into how a piece of equipment or a system is utilized in practice, and how they fit their intended purpose. Interviews with end users have also highlighted possible issues related to

sustainability and current status of acquired equipment, transport vehicles and communication systems. Site visits have been designed to combine several cases (e.g. a visit to a Romanian BCP could cover case studies RO2, RO3, RO4 and RO6).

Table 1 Romania – site visits

Site name	Case studies covered	Dates
Headquarters Romanian Border Police (incl. Command and Control Centre)	RO1 RO2 RO3	Feb. 24
Headquarters Ministry of Interior: - Archive - National Schengen Centre	RO1 – RO7	Feb. 25
Headquarters National Police: - e-learning training centre - IT Directorate	RO6	Feb. 25
Rural police department near Galati	RO6	April 1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Consular section (Training centre)	RO7	Feb. 25
Romanesti border sector (Botosani border inspectorate)	RO1, RO2, RO3, RO4,	March 18-19
Galati border sector	RO1, RO4	April 1
Constanta border sector	RO1	March 31

The tables below summarize the data collection methods used for each of the case studies in Romania.

Table 2: Case studies Romania

Case Study	Objective ¹ / measure	Description	Data Collection	Value EUR
RO1	Objective 1, Measure 1	<u>RO FSCH 18</u> Increasing naval and terrestrial mobility of the Romanian Border Police teams: 9 contracts -- river and maritime patrol ships; pontoons	Document Review, In-depth interviews, Site visit	103,691,503
		5 contracts -- 1226 terrestrial vehicles (ATV, 4x4, vans, cars)	Document Review, Survey	
RO2	Objective	<u>RO FSCH 19</u>		33,973,146

¹ As set in the national indicative programme 2007-2009 for Romania

	1, Measure 2	Modernization and re-configuration of BCPs to fit the new/ future needs of surveillance and control - 31 BP headquarters renovated (56 contracts)	Document Review, In-depth interviews	
RO3	Objective 1	<u>RO FSCH 23</u> Upgrading capacity of carrying out the surveillance and control: 24 contracts – different inspection, detection, and control equipment	Document Review, Survey	20,589,115
RO4	Objective 2, Measure 2	<u>RO-FSCH 1</u> TETRA terminals for the MAI	Document Review, Survey	25,803,523
RO5	Objective 2, Measure 1	<u>RO-FSCH 2</u> National IT System for Alerts (NISA)	Document Review, Survey	17,406,692
		<u>RO-FSCH 21</u> Rural areas with access to NISA	Document Review, Survey	24,426,815
RO6	Objective 2, Measure 6	<u>RO FSCH 10</u> Enhancement of the IT system capacity needed for implementation of SIS II (8 contracts)	Document Review, In-depth interviews, Site visit	21,616,208
RO7	Objective 1, Measures 3 and 4	<u>RO FSCH 12</u> Rehabilitation of the Romanian Consular Offices	Document Review, In-depth interviews, Survey	21,855,350
Total				269,362,352

Case study profiles

RO 1	Objective 1, RO FSCH 18	Increasing naval and terrestrial mobility of the Romanian Border Police: river and maritime patrol ships; pontoons, terrestrial vehicles	103 691 503
Description	<p>This was the largest single measure of the SF II for Romania in terms of financial value. It was aimed at both replacing obsolete and decommissioned vessels and vehicles and adding new capacity for control of the 'blue' and 'green' borders.</p> <p>The measure was implemented through 14 contracts for acquisition of ships and patrol boats, pontoons and terrestrial vehicles. It also included modernization of existing vessels and pontoons.</p> <p>Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed 100% as planned and included the delivery of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 patrol boats; • 4 maritime vessels; • 3 mooring pontoons; • 1 226 terrestrial vehicles (576 off-road and ATVs, 350 cars, 250 minivans and 50 dog transportation vehicles). <p>Per the EC Final Audit report (2011), sample checks of purchased vehicles confirmed they were used for border surveillance.</p>		
Methodology	<p>Document review Familiarisation interviews Site visits and in-depth interviews Survey Analysis of indicators data</p>		
Indicators	<p>- Increased capacity of the Romanian Border police to control the blue and green border areas; - Increased effectiveness and efficiency in combating irregular border crossing and trans-border crime; - Improved communications and interaction capability among Border Police patrol teams.</p>		
Interviewees / respondents	<p>Directorate for border surveillance and border crossing control Coast Guard Galati and Constanta BPCI for component 1 Romanesti for component 2 2 ship captains (patrol boat), 2 mechanics, 1 naval unit manager 1 surveillance unit officer</p>		
RO 2	Objective 1, RO FSCH 19	Modernization and re-configuration of BCPs to fit the new/ future needs of surveillance and control	33 973 146
Description	<p>The measure involved the renovation of 31 BP headquarters and BCP facilities, most of which were built in the period 1960-1975 and were in poor condition. The contracts under this measure included: technical design of planned works, refurbishment of roofs and terraces, repair and replacement of the carpentry, setting up of independent heating installations, construction of garages for special vehicles for surveillance and intervention, connections to the gas, water-sewing, and electric networks.</p> <p>Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed in time, with the exception of 8 contracts for which work continued at the time of the report.</p> <p>Per the EC Final Audit report (2011), sample checks of locations</p>		

	<p>included in this measure verified the completion of the renovation works. The only reported problem was that a small part of the BP facilities at the Halmeu Border Police Sector were used (presumably temporarily) by Customs instead of BP.</p> <p>Per initial document review (evaluations of the impact of SF II for Romania) serious coordination problems between the technical design and the implementation of the renovation works delayed the completion and undermined the efficiency of some of the works (e.g. in some facilities renovation works had to be re-designed and redone due to faults in the technical design).</p>		
Methodology	<p>Document review Familiarisation interviews In-depth interviews Analysis of indicators data</p>		
Indicators	<p>- Improvement of working conditions at the renovated BP headquarters and BCPs; - Increased effectiveness and efficiency of BP officers and employees in renovated facilities.</p>		
Interviewees	<p>Schengen Directorate (MIA) Directorate for Logistics, Unit for real estate management (Inspectorate General of Romanian Border Police) Heads of selected BP headquarters and BCPs (Romanesti and Galati) Contractors performing renovation works in selected BP HQ and BCPs</p>		
RO 3	Objective 1, RO FSCH 23	Upgrading Romanian Border Police capacity of surveillance and control of the EU external borders	20 589 115
Description	<p>The measure aimed at enhancing the technical capacity of the Romanian BP through acquisition of various specialised equipment. The implementation involved 24 contracts that included delivery of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • devices for documents examination and bio-detection; • vehicle control equipment; • individual tools and accessories (camouflage suits, handcuffs, flashlights, baton, teargas sprays); • equipment for mobile communications and satellite tracking; • equipment for voice communications services; • special surveillance vehicles • integrated surveillance system for the Danube region (Caras-Severin). <p>Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed as planned. Per the EC Final Audit report (2011), sample checks were carried out on the use of purchased equipment. No problems were reported.</p> <p>Per initial document review (evaluations of the impact of SF II for Romania) some of the components of this measure (e.g. the integrated surveillance system for the Danube region, the installation of vehicle control equipment) were dependent on the completion of actions outside the SF II. These actions were still in progress at the time the SF contracts had to be delivered.</p>		
Methodology	<p>Document review Familiarisation interviews Survey Analysis of indicators data</p>		
Indicators	<p>- Improvement of surveillance and control capacities of BP officers. - Improved efficiency in utilization of human resources in surveillance activities.</p>		

	- Improvement in irregular border crossing detection and vehicle control at BCPs.		
Interviewees/ respondents	Schengen Directorate (MIA) Directorate for border surveillance and border crossing control (Inspectorate General of Romanian Border Police) Directorate for communications and information technology Caras-Severin BPCI BP officers trained to use the equipment (BCPs Naidas, Moravita, Halmeu and Jimbolia)		
RO 4	Objective 2, RO FSCH 1	Purchase of Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) terminals	25 803 523
Description	<p>The project was implemented by the General Directorate for Information Technology and Communication. It was complementary to a Phare project which funded TETRA equipment for 3 border counties (Iași, Vaslui and Galați). The current measure included delivery of TETRA terminals and training of personnel for the deployment of the equipment. The terminals acquired under this measure have been used for the mobile component of the national SIS II. The equipment and training were provided under three separate contracts and included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • mobile and fixed TETRA terminals; • hand-held TETRA terminals; • portable data terminals (Pocket PC); • hand-held TETRA terminals; • TETRA dispatch consoles; • training for programming and installation of terminals; • installation of mobile TETRA terminals on vehicles, motorcycles and helicopters; • installation of fixed TETRA terminals in operational buildings. <p>The beneficiaries were MAI structures in Bucharest and in 27 counties in Romania. Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed as planned. The EC Final Audit report (2011) does not mention any checks of the TETRA equipment and training provided under this measure.</p>		
Methodology	Document review Familiarisation interviews Survey Analysis of indicators data		
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational data on voice and data traffic performance. - Increased coverage (as % of national territory) as a result of the implementation of this measure. - Improved connectivity and increased use of the N.SIS II through the newly installed TETRA equipment. 		
Interviewees/ respondents	Schengen Directorate (MIA) Directorate for communications and information technology BP officers trained to install and use the TETRA equipment BP officers using TETRA terminals in their daily work		
RO 5	Objective 2, RO FSCH 2 and RO FSCH 21	Roll-out of National IT System for Alerts (NISA); providing access to NISA in rural areas	17 406 692; 24 426 815
Description	<p>The measures were implemented by the Special Telecommunications Service of Romania. The objective of the two measures was to develop a National IT System for Alerts (NISA) that allows competent authorities in Romania to access alerts on persons and good from SIS II. NISA is designed to support activities like border control, issuing visas and residence permits and other types of controls. The following public authorities in Romania are entitled to access the SIS II:</p>		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Romanian Police <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Romanian Border Police ▪ Romanian Gendarmerie ▪ SIRENE Office ▪ Romanian Immigration Office ▪ National Inspectorate for Persons Records ▪ General Directorate of Passports ▪ Directorate for Drivers Licenses and Vehicles Registration ▪ National Customs Authority ▪ Ministry of Foreign Affairs ▪ Ministry of Justice and law enforcement authorities <p>The measure included the construction of a dedicated building for NISA and training of IT staff for monitoring and maintenance of the system. The rural component of the measure (RO FSCH 21) provided broadband wireless access to NISA for the competent state and local authorities in the country.</p> <p>Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed 100% in the national component (RO FSCH 2), and was almost completed in the rural component (RO FSCH 21).</p> <p>The EC Final Audit report (2011) does not mention any checks of the work carried out under the NISA related measures.</p> <p>Per initial document review (evaluations of the impact of SF II for Romania), at the time of developing NISA, technical difficulties related to SIS II forced the developers of NISA to connect it through SISone4ALL .</p>		
Methodology	<p style="text-align: center;">Document review Familiarisation interviews Survey Analysis of indicators data</p> <p>A sample approach will be employed, as there is a great variety of equipment and devices purchased under this measure. The evaluation efforts will focus on two large contracts, for special surveillance vehicles and for the integrated surveillance system for the Danube region. Taken together, these two items account for 13.9M EUR, or 68% of the total contract value for this measure.</p>		
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational data on connection to and use of NISA by competent authorities. - Number of counties (% of national territory) connected to and using NISA. - Improved connectivity and increased use of SIS II through NISA. 		
Interviewees/ respondents	<p>Schengen Directorate (MIA) Special Telecommunications Service Directorate for communications and information technology (MIA) Sample of competent authorities throughout the country utilising NISA.</p>		
RO 6	Objective 2, RO FSCH 10	Enhancement of the IT system capacity needed for implementation of SIS II	21 616 208
Description	<p>The measure was implemented by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police (IGPR) and the objective was to strengthen the IT capacity of the Romanian Police to interact with N.SIS II. Under the measure, 4 contracts were implemented, providing software (applications for both NISA and SIS II access, and an e-learning system) and hardware (servers, PCs, printers, scanners, storage and back-up systems).</p> <p>Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed 100%.</p> <p>The EC Final Audit report (2011) does not mention specifically this measure in any checks of the work related to SIS II.</p>		

Methodology	Document review Familiarisation interviews In-depth interviews Site visit Analysis of indicators data		
Indicators	- Operational data on connection to and use of N.SIS II by end users. - Number of counties and police departments (% of national territory) connected to and using N.SIS II. - Improved connectivity and increased use of N.SIS II and NISA.		
Interviewees	Schengen Directorate (MIA) General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police Sample of end users of software and hardware acquired under this measure.		
RO 7	Objective 1, RO FSC 12	Rehabilitation of the Romanian Consular Offices	21 855 350
Description	The measure was implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The objective was to upgrade a number of consular offices in third countries to the standards of the Schengen Catalogue. In addition, a training centre for consular office personnel was set up in Romania to provide ongoing training. The measure included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 rehabilitation projects in the following locations: Belgrade - Serbia, Moscow - Russia, Cairo - Egypt, Ankara Turkey, Damascus - Syria, Sankt Petersburg - Russia, Odessa - Ukraine, Doha - Qatar, Tbilisi - Georgia, Cahul and Bălți - Moldova. • purchase of 5 buildings for the consular offices in Shanghai - P.R. China, Tbilisi - Georgia, Cahul and Balti - Moldova, Tunis – Tunisia; • purchase of specific equipment for 73 Consulate Offices in third countries (equipment for processing visa requests, detecting false documents, security equipment, safe boxes for depositing the visa stickers, metal detection instruments, etc.); • purchase of building in Bucharest for a Training Centre for the personnel with consular responsibilities. <p>Per the final Comprehensive Report (2011), the measure was completed 100%.</p> <p>Per initial document review (evaluations of the impact of SF II for Romania), there were more Consulate Offices short-listed for rehabilitation or purchase of new buildings: 11 were contracted out of 20 short-listed for rehabilitation, and 5 were purchased out of 7 short-listed for purchase. Checks at two Moldovan and the Istanbul consular offices quoted good practices.</p>		
Methodology	Document review Familiarisation interviews Survey In-depth interviews Analysis of indicators data Due to the multitude of contracts (over 150), a threshold of materiality has been established for contracts only above € 100,000, and only such contracts have been assessed.		
Indicators	- Consular Offices are operational and in compliance with the Schengen Catalogue. - Utilisation of the Training Centre in Bucharest. - Training completed for the equipment purchased for Consular Offices.		
Interviewees/ respondents	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General of Consular Affairs Head of consular offices which were beneficiaries of the measure Office for Immigration		

RO 1 - Objective 1: Increasing naval and terrestrial mobility of the Romanian Border Police: river and maritime patrol ships; pontoons, terrestrial vehicles

Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, decisions of the tender selection commissions (CFCU and Ministry of Foreign Affairs); comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; mission reports by the EC; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government; presentations and statistical data provided by the Romanian Border Guard	
Interviews	Border Guards Headquarters group meeting	
	Head of Galati Border Region	Head of Braila Repair Base of the Border Police
	Head of Galati Border Police Territorial Service	Deputy Head of Braila Repair Base of the Border Police
	Head of Naval Base at Galati Border Police Territorial Service	Deputy head of Romanian Border Guard
	Captain of SNR 1 boat at Galati Border Police Territorial Service	Responsible officer of pontoon facility, Galati
	Captain of ONYX 25D boat at Galati Border Police Territorial Service	Driver / investigator of Audi A4 at Galati
	Driver / surveillance officer Land Rover Surveillance vehicle	Head of Constanta Naval Group
	Head of Constanta Border Police Territorial Service	Officers at Constanta Naval Group
	Head of SCOMAR section	Captain of Off-shore Patrol Vessel (OPV)
	Communications Officer of OPV	Chief Mechanic of OPV
Site visits	March 31 – Constanta Border Sector and Naval Base April 1 - Galati Border Sector and the Braila Maintenance Base	
Survey	A questionnaire was distributed to 116 drivers or maintenance staff of vehicles around the country. 78 survey responses were received back (some did not identify the type of vehicle):	
	4	AUDI A4
	24	IVECO MASSIF
	8	MITSUBISHI
	12	VW PASSAT
	9	VW TRANSPORTER
	11	ATV DINLI CENTHOR
Key Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased effectiveness in combating irregular border crossing and trans-border crime (Number of ships observed; number of irregularities / crimes detected; decreased reaction times) • Increased capacity of the Romanian Border police to control the blue and green border areas (Number of hours patrolling; Number of patrols deployed in the contiguous, exclusive economic area, territorial sea; participation in Frontex operations and joint operations with Bulgarian and Ukrainian border police forces) • Improved communications and interaction capability among Border Police patrol teams • Increased efficiency in performing tasks (quantity of fuel used; number of hours of patrolling; maintenance costs) 	

Key Findings

- This was the largest single measure of the SF II for Romania in terms of financial value. It was aimed at both replacing obsolete and decommissioned vessels and vehicles and adding new capacity for control of the 'blue' and 'green' borders.

- The measure was implemented through 14 contracts, worth a total 103 691 503 euro, for acquisition of ships and patrol boats, pontoons and terrestrial vehicles. It also included modernization of existing vessels and pontoons.
- The investment has a very high level of relevance, as it supports a core mission of the Romanian Border Police in terms of its commitment to the Schengen Border Code.
- The overall effect of the measure seems to have been positive, as the investment has enhanced the capacity of the Romanian Border Police to carry out surveillance activities on the Blue and Green borders. It has also greatly improved working conditions for the personnel
- The efficiency in terms of procurement seems to be at a good level with sufficient competition that provided good value for money.
- The project is complementary to various other investments in terrestrial and maritime mobility and surveillance equipment acquired under the PHARE programmes and the External Border Fund.
- The data that has been provided so far makes it difficult to assess the operational efficiency and the impact achieved with the investment.

Description and background

Romania's external borders include land borders with Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova, a sea border at the Black Sea (193 km), and river borders with Serbia (Danube), Moldova (681 km of the Prut River and a very small section of the Danube) and Ukraine (along the Danube delta and small section of the Prut river). The total length of the external borders is 2,070.6 km. The investment of made under Objective 1, aimed at increasing the mobility of the Romanian Border Guard via new terrestrial vehicles and river / maritime vessels along all these borders. The measure is related to the third filter of the Integrated Border Security System, 'Control and surveillance of the Romanian Border'.

Figure 1: External borders of Romania



Maritime and river borders surveillance

The Romanian Coast Guard (a unit of the Romanian Border Police) is in charge of border control at the Black Sea and the border along the Danube River Delta, while

the other sections of the Danube and the Prut (along the borders with Moldova and Ukraine) are controlled by the Border Police Territorial Inspectorates.

The surveillance of the maritime border is performed through the integrated command and control system SCOMAR (see more on the SCOMAR system in the Complementarity section). At the river border, an integrated surveillance system for the traffic of ships on the Danube River and in the Danube Delta, named SCOD, is used.

In 2006 the Romanian Government prepared *Conception for surveillance of the naval traffic and monitoring suspect vessels on the interior Danube, Danube-Black Sea channel, lower Danube and Black Sea* as well as *Sectoral Strategy of the Romanian Border Police on Surveillance and Control of the Maritime border*. These documents helped determining the needs for the investments in maritime and river patrol and surveillance vessels. For instance, on the Danube River the present number of river vessels is based on the following criteria:

- a boat is needed at every 10 km
- a river patrol and intervention cutter at every 25 km
- a river patrol and intervention ship at every 50 km.

On the Black sea the concept aimed to provide adequate coverage of all areas of the blue border²:

- The Coast Guard maritime fleet consists of 16 ships:
- 1 OPV is needed to extend the reach of SCOMAR through longer missions in the economic zone, but also in the contiguous zone, depending on the migratory pressures. The OPV gives an opportunity to have advanced surveillance coverage in the economic zone not so much through active patrolling, but rather drifting, at 5-6 knots. OPV may perform patrolling missions based on risk analysis and in high-risk zones.
- 2 Patrol ships for intervention in the contiguous zone (provided by the CPV P-157)
- 3 Intervention ships are needed to ensure the operational intervention in the contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone (they are faster than patrol ships, but may also have patrol functions). They are sent for punctual interventions (40 knots). 3 maritime intervention ships (CPV Shaldag MK IV)
- 5 ships for harbour and coastal control CPB RODMAN R-1120
- 4 smaller and lighter – river delta intervention boats
- Logistics ship
- Fuel-tank ship

Table 3. Maritime and river mobility acquisitions under the Schengen Facility

Location	Quantity	Mission / Type of vessel / model	Manufacturer / country
Black Sea	1	Offshore surveillance patrol vessel	Damen shipyard (RO / NL)
	3	Coastal patrol vessel	Shaldag (Israel)
Danube and Prut rivers	5	River patrolling boats (SNR 1)	Istanbul Ship Yard (Turkey)
	20	Intervention and patrolling boats (ONIX 26 SD)	Tehnomont (Croatia)

² The Romanian maritime border has the following parameters: Internal maritime waters (ports, some harbours): 753 km²; Territorial waters (12 miles from the coastline): 4.487 km²; Contiguous zone (24 miles from the coastline): 4.460 km²; Exclusive economic zone: 20.000 km². The length of the maritime borders are: seashore: 243, 2 km, sea border with_Ukraine: 31, 7 km, sea border with Bulgaria: 22, 2 km.

3	Mooring pontoons with cabins
6	6 mobile surveillance points

The five river patrol boats SNR17 carry out their activities on the Danube as follows: two boats patrol the Ukrainian border, one boat the Moldavian border and the maritime sector of the interior Danube, and two boats patrol the Serbian border. The investment in maritime mobility also included the upgrading of four P157 patrol ships, 2 PD50 bedroom pontoons and 6 PD40 bedroom pontoons. Some of the acquired equipment is presented in the pictures below:

Figure 2: Maritime surveillance: Off-shore Patrol Vessel by Damen and the Shaldag



Source: Romanian Coast Guard

Figure 3: River patrol boat: SNR 17 and the Onyx 26 SD



Source: Romanian Coast Guard

In addition, to the maritime vessels, 3 pontoons were acquired, and several existing pontoons were upgraded. The pontoons are a necessary piece of equipment for the operation of any river port, especially the ones that lack dedicated port infrastructure such as buildings and a pier. It is a facility that provides a place for the crew to rest, dine, or carry out any administrative duties. In addition it is used to host communication and surveillance equipment. The Galati Border Police port facility consisted of a pontoon that was over thirty years old. It lacked adequate toilet and kitchen facilities, and had very basic and outdated communications equipment. The new pontoons transformed the Galati Border Police into a modern port facility – that not only significantly improved the accommodation conditions for the crews, but added modern communications and surveillance equipment. The surveillance equipment

expanded the capacity of the border police to observe a section of the Danube River that lacked adequate surveillance coverage.³

Terrestrial mobility

In 2009, the number of **necessary** special vehicles was 5471, whilst the existing number was 1544. At that time, the car park of the General Inspectorate of Border Police was made up mainly of old vehicles (some of the special vehicles Aro, Dacia, Cielo, Renault etc. had been purchased in the period 1993-2001) and some newer ones (in the period 2002-2005 the brands Nissan Terano and Opel Astra had been purchased with PHARE funds).⁴

The analysis for establishing the necessary categories of vehicles to be acquired through the Schengen facility was based on the following principles:

- organisation of border check and surveillance activity on 5 duty shifts
- ensuring border check and surveillance 24/7
- organisation of surveillance missions according to the three alignments⁵
- focusing the efforts of border surveillance on the possible directions of actions of the perpetrators, based on the risk analysis and intelligence
- Organisation of surveillance through constant change of the border posts and patrols positions according to the operational situation.

Besides these principles, the following norms and criteria were considered for calculating the necessary terrestrial mobility means at the land border:

- pedestrian patrol (made up of 2 border policemen) for 1.5 km at night and 2 km at day time
- a mobile patrol (made up of 2 border policemen) for 10 km at night and 15 km at day time

The important criteria for replacement were insufficient capacity at a given location and the physical depreciation of equipment. The main categories of equipment which at the time were registered for showing major deficits and being technically outdated were the following:

- Special vehicle for operational activity (city vehicle): This type of special vehicle is in the endowment of all territorial and central units of Romanian Border Police and the following types of vehicles were assigned for this category: Dacia cars (1310, 1310 Break, Logan), ARO (243, 244, 246), Opel Astra, Nissan Terano and Nissan Terano II. These vehicles are used most of the time on regular roads (70-80% of their activity).
- Special patrolling vehicles: This type of special vehicles is the main category of vehicles used in state border surveillance and the following types were assigned for this category: ARO series (243, 244, 246), Nissan series (Terano II, Terano and Pathfinder), Jeep Grand Cherokee and KIA Sorento. These vehicles are used most of the time on unpaved roads (75 – 85 % of their activity).
- ATV – four wheels motorcycles: These types of vehicles are used for border surveillance and the following types were assigned for this category: ATV Roush Artic Cat. They are used occasionally on paved roads and most of the time (85 – 95 %) on unpaved roads and in difficult terrain.

³ The new facility also reduced the environmental impact of the port facility as it included a water treatment equipment.

⁴ Data on car-models and principles for identifying needs were presented in written communication and during interviews by the Romanian Border Guard.

⁵ The three alignments include: border crossing point area, border area, and extended 30 km zone inside the border.

- Special vehicles for transporting persons (8+1 places) and / or intervention: These vehicles are used for border surveillance and the following types were assigned for this category: Mercedes Benz Vito and Volkswagen Transporter, purchased in the period 2001-2002. They are used occasionally on unpaved roads (15 – 25%), but are mainly used on paved roads.
- Special vehicles for transporting service dogs: These vehicles were used for transporting the service dogs of the Romanian Border Police structures in optimum conditions (from a ventilation and climate control). The vehicles used before the Schengen Facility acquisition were inappropriate (Peugeot Partner, ARO 246 and Dacia 1310).

The Schengen Facility measure was designed to address the above-identified mobility needs. Through 14 contracts awarded within the measure, the following equipment was acquired:

Table 4. Quantity and type of vehicles purchased under Schengen Facility

Location	Quantity	Type / Model	Mission	Manufacturer / contractor
Ukraine border Moldova border Serbia border Black Sea coast Bucharest	426	Off-road 4x4 / Iveco Massif	Patrol and surveillance	Iveco (IT) / Roots Motors
	350	Sedan / VW Passat Variant	Service / Investigations	Volkswagen (DE) / Porsche Romania
	250	Minivans / VW Transporter	Transportation	Volkswagen (DE)
	50	Transportation vehicles Mitsubishi Double Cab L200	Canine Transportation	Mitsubishi (JP) / Auto House
	52	Sedan Audi A4 Quattro	Investigation	Audi (DE) / Porsche Romania
	150	ATVs DINLI Centhor 700	Patrol	DINLI (Taiwan) / C&I

Source: Romanian Border Police

Figure 4: Surveillance and patrol vehicles: Iveco Massif and ATVs DINLI Centhor 700, and Canine transportation Mitsubishi Double Cab L200



Source: Romanian Border Police

Relevance

As described above, the vessels and vehicles before the Schengen Facility could not meet the needs of the Romanian Border Police. The measure addressed these needs both in terms of larger quantities of vessels and vehicles, and in terms of more effective and reliable means for surveillance of the blue and green borders.

The older maritime ships were ineffective due to the following shortcomings:

- they had been in use for more than 20 years;
- out-of-date technical and tactical characteristics;
- out-of-date navigation and detection systems;
- very high fuel consumption;
- they required a high number of personnel to operate them.

The replaced river patrol boats, types F 50, Drusilla, P30, had the following shortcomings:

- too long exploitation period (more than 20 years);
- out-of-date technical characteristics;
- very high fuel consumptions

The investment made under this measure is directly linked to the main objectives of the Schengen Facility, as the vessels and vehicles acquired are almost entirely dedicated to the core function of the Romanian Border Guard – the surveillance and patrol of the external borders. In that respect the achieved increased capacity and effectiveness for surveillance corresponds to all main strategic documents of the Romanian Border Guard, such as *The national strategy of integrated management of the Romanian state border for the period 2007 – 2010* and *The National Strategy for Accession into Schengen* as well as *the Schengen Action Plan*.

One exception, where no convincing data was provided concerns the acquisition of the 52 Audi A4 Quattro vehicles. Their acquisition was justified with the need to provide vehicles for “under-cover investigations and high-speed chases”:

- No data could be obtained on the number of investigations, high-speed chases or under-cover missions, when the vehicles were used
- The site visits showed that some of the Audi A4 is used also by the top management in their daily work, where presumably a luxury model serves representative functions, rather than operational requirements. Per comments from the Romanian Border Police, this is not a common practice.
- The interview with one of the investigators who was using the model for investigative purposes also showed that it was used for investigations of cross-border criminality (mostly cigarettes smuggling cases) which was not necessarily relevant to the objectives of the Schengen facility.
- The use of 13 out of 52 of the vehicles in Bucharest also makes it unclear how they serve external border related investigations, even though it is plausible that certain number of the cross-border cases have links with criminal groups operating out of Bucharest.

The appropriateness of the types of vehicles acquired is also largely supported by the results of the survey of users of the vehicles. Out of 78 respondents, 74% indicated that the vehicle meets completely their technical needs, while 22% responded that they met most of their needs. Only 4% indicated that “some of the needs” were met. An almost identical split resulted in the question if the optional equipment and features of the vehicles satisfied their needs.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the maritime and river vessels acquired through the Schengen Facility should be evaluated in the context of the overall concept for border control of

the external sea and river borders of Romania. This section assesses the effectiveness at the different types of external borders.


Black Sea border

An offshore patrol vessel (OPV) was purchased in order to extend the surveillance beyond SCOMAR's capabilities. SCOMAR is the surveillance system at the Black Sea for detection, identification and pursuit of ships in the Romanian maritime zones.

Launched in 2009, SCOMAR covers Romania's territorial waters and contiguous zone. With the deployment of the offshore patrol vessel (OPV) in 2010, surveillance is extended beyond the 24 nautical miles contiguous zone into the exclusive economic zone of Romania. Interacting with SCOMAR, the OPV can now perform long-term missions of 5 and more days (with the longest mission so far of 12 days). With the addition of a second crew, the potential length of the missions was extended to 20 days, and a planned third crew would extend the missions to more than 20 days (per interviews with members of the Romanian Coast Guard). The enhanced effectiveness of the surveillance reduces significantly the risk of border violations and allows the patrol ships to react in a very short timeframe.

Along with the OPV, 3 maritime intervention ships (SHALDAG MK IV) were purchased in order to ensure the operational intervention in the contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone.

Figure 5: Romania's Black Sea border



Source: Romanian Coast Guard

The newly acquired ships replaced older patrol and intervention ships (0111C and 834M). The data presented in the tables below show the hours of surveillance/patrolling and the number of missions carried out by the old and the new ships (see Table 5 and Table 6). Comparison of the data on hours of operation and number of missions for the old and new ships indicates that the economic hardships experienced by Romania in the period 2009-2012 caused reduction of surveillance and

patrolling missions. Interviews during the site visit to Constanta confirmed this. For the new ships, limits on fuel consumption were compensated by more intense use of the OPV, at the expense of the three maritime patrol and intervention vessels. Due to its capacity to spend longer time off-shore with very little fuel consumption, the OPV is considered a cost-effective means for surveillance missions. If interception is required, either the OPV's smaller boat may be used, or smaller ships are involved.

Table 5: Hours and number of missions for ships acquired through the Schengen facility

Type of vessel	No of ships	Hours of surveillance/patrolling			Number of missions									Joint patrols				
		2011	2012	2013	2011			2012			2013			2011	2012	2013		
					TW	CZ	EEZ	TW	CZ	EEZ	TW	CZ	EEZ					
Maritime Patrol and Intervention Ships Shaldag MK IV	3	579	136	854	7	1	6	4	0	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	12
					70			15			59							
Maritime Surveillance and Patrol Ship OPV 6610 Damen	1	233	273	482	4	0	5	1	0	3	1	0	8					
					9			21			23			0	0	0		

Note: TW – Territorial waters, CZ – Contiguous zone, EEZ – Exclusive economic zone

Table 6: Hours and number of missions of older ships (replaced by ships from the SF)

Type of vessel	No of ships	Hours of surveillance/patrolling		Number of missions		Joint patrols	
		2008	2009	2008	2009	2008	2009
Maritime Intervention Ship 834M	3	0	34	0	5	0	0
Maritime Patrol and Intervention Ship 0111C	2	666	188	43	11	0	0

Source: Romanian Coast Guard

In comparison to the old ships, the new ones have the following advantages:

- higher *speed*;
- greater *manoeuvrability*;
- greater *sea keeping*, i.e. the capacity of the vessel to float in bad weather conditions, such as high waves, strong wind and decreased visibility. The new vessels allow patrolling practically in sea states;
- greater *sustainability of the course* – the ships keep their set course for a long time without a rudder correction. The old ships required constant correction of the course, which strained the navigator of the vessel;
- greater *autonomy (endurance)* – the vessels can spend considerably more time at sea in bad weather conditions – the living conditions are much better (the old ships did not provide for the basic sanitation needs);

- availability of *own boat* on board used for inspection of other vessels.

The rapid intervention ships act in the territorial waters, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone based on the information sent by the OPV Vessel and SCOMAR system.

Comparing the data for the period 2011-2013, it should be noted that while the potential length of missions of the OPV is 12 days and more (per interviews and data from the Romanian Border Guard), the average length of the 2011 missions was 26 hours. It went down to 13 hours in 2012, and climbed back to 21 hours in 2013. For 2014, the length of missions is scheduled to increase further owing to availability of additional crews certified for that purpose.

For the three patrol and intervention ships Shaldag MK IV, the average length increased from 8-9 hours for the 2011-2012 period, to 14 hours in 2013.

Danube River, the Danube Delta and Prut River

The surveillance of the Danube River and the border line is ensured by **SCOD** – a complex observation system at the Danube and the Danube Delta consisting of electro-optical and radiolocation sensors, network for transmission of data and work stations of operators. The system also deploys patrol and intervention naval means, mobile pontoons for surveillance and monitoring of naval traffic, and fixed and mobile observation points.

The objectives of 20 light patrol boats and 5 river cutters were to extend the length of the border surveillance and control missions, to ensure the control of ships in transit and to comply with the norms for safety of the ships. The new ships replaced older boat types F 50, Drusilla, P30, which had the following shortcomings:

- too long exploitation period (more than 20 years);
- out-of-date technical characteristics;
- very high fuel consumptions

Table 7: Working hours and number of missions of river vessels acquired from SF

Vessels type	Number of ships	Working hours			Number of missions		
		2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013
River patrol boat SNR 17	5	86	273	836	3	29	79
River patrol and intervention boat ONIX 26SD	20	3,035	4,592	6,263	945	1,645	2,059

Table 8: Working hours and number of missions for river vessels replaced by vessels from SF

Vessels type	Number of ships	Working hours		Number of missions	
		2008	2009	2008	2009
Boats with detachable engine Drussila	3	358	153	126	59
Boats with detachable engine F50	6	673	507	225	120
Patrol and intervention boats 34	2	0	0	0	0
Patrol and intervention ship Freeway	2	0	0	0	0

Source: Romanian Coast Guard

Similar to maritime ships, river boats were affected by the economic hardships after 2009. Still, the patrolling hours of the boats acquired from the Schengen Facility have grown steadily in the 2011-2013 period.

To deal with the specifics of the Danube and Prut rivers (swamps, large shallow areas at the Danube delta, lack of piers and ports at smaller towns along the rivers), the Schengen Facility was used to acquire and upgrade two types of pontoons: landing pontoons and hulk pontoons (RD-40 and RD-50). The pontoons are used as piers for river boats and ships, and also as sites for parts of the SCOD system.

The most significant impact of the newly acquired sea and river vessels is:

- **Decreased time for reaction of the border police forces.** Interviews in Galati confirmed that the reaction time with the new boats has been significantly reduced.
- **Increased operational autonomy:** The new ships have much bigger degree of operational autonomy, due to their extended range and endurance. The OPV can perform 5- to 12-day missions. Since 2013, a second crew has been formed in order to increase the number of days spent at sea, and the ship can now perform missions of up to 20 days. A further training is under way to train a 3rd crew to further increase the ship's effectiveness. The extended autonomy allows the ship to perform surveillance in the contiguous and the exclusive economic zones, and to facilitate the faster and more precise actions of the intervention ships. The length of missions of the river boats has also increased. If earlier missions of the larger boats (SNR 17) lasted on average 2-4 hours, in 2013 the average length was 9-10 hours.
- **Increased number of sea patrols.** Data presented by the Romanian Coast Guard shows that while with the surveillance system SCOMAR the need for regular patrolling is declining, the newly acquired ships have performed more patrolling missions, despite the ongoing economic crisis (Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8).
- **Increased number of observed targets, of inspections and of detected violations.** (Table 9, Table 10).
- **Increased number of joint patrols with the Bulgaria border police along the Danube River and the Black Sea, and increased capacity of Border Police to take part in FRONTEX joint operations.** Data provided by the Coast Guard shows that its vessels participated in 2012 in 20 Frontex operations, while in 2013 they participated only in 13 operations. On the other hand the joint missions with Ukraine increased from 32 in 2012 to 46 in 2013. Similarly, 61 joint patrol missions with Bulgaria took place in 2012 and increased to 79 in 2013⁶.

Table 9: Operational effectiveness at the Black Sea border

Type of vessel	No of observed targets	No of targets followed	No of targets boarded for inspection	No of targets on fined	No of targets with criminal offences detected	No of targets arrested
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⁶ These missions are part of the European Patrol Network initiative. They took place in the area between the Romanian and Bulgarian sea border is code-named "Hotel" or "H".

	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013
3 patrol and intervention ship Shaldag MK IV	177	519	439	11	15	10	15	27	21	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	4
Patrol and surveillance vessel OPV 6610 Damen	1417	558	2017	26	0	42	22	0	32	0	0	0	2	0	2	3	0	2

Table 10: Operational effectiveness at River borders


Quantity / Type of vessel	No of observed targets			No of targets followed			No of targets boarded for inspection			No targets which resulted in crimes			No of targets which resulted in arrests		
	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013	2011	2012	2013
5 River Patrol Ships SNR 17	38	168	1083	4	24	37	8	44	90	0	4	7	0	4	7
20 river patrol and intervention boats ONIX 26SD	12044	16673	15803	107	136	139	1158	1485	1735	23	35	51	9	7	16

Source: Romanian Border Police

Terrestrial vehicles

The Romanian border guard provided detailed data on the number of missions of all vehicles (except Audi A4 Quattro). The data provided did, however, not indicate the actual number of hours that vehicles were used for patrolling, but used a standard rate of 35 km per hour (for Iveco Masiff) and 60 km per hour (for all others – VW Passat, VW Combi, ATV, and Mitsubishi canine transportation vehicles). The data for patrolling hours per year provided, was simply a division of the annual number of kilometres that the vehicle has passed divided either by 35 or by 60. This data also did not allow to assess how much vehicles were used for different missions, as patrolling and surveillance were only part of the missions of the vehicles acquired.

Table 11. Annual number of km travelled by vehicles purchased under the Schengen Facility



Source: Romanian Border Guard

The data provided clearly shows that the ATVs and canine transportation vehicles are used much less than the other types of vehicles. The reasons behind the drop in the use of Iveco Massif between 2012 and 2013 needs to be explained following some additional interviews or comments by the Romanian Border Guard. The data provided shows that at 11 out of the 50 local border police stations the drop in the annual number of kilometres of this type of vehicles was between 100% and 300%.

Efficiency

Procurement

The measure included a total of 14 contracts, 9 for the maritime mobility component, and 5 for the terrestrial mobility component. The tendering processes for the two components were quite different in terms of competition: for the maritime tenders, there were less bidders per tender, and many of them were disqualified in the pre-selection stage, resulting in 3 (out of 4) major tenders with only one qualified participant. **Comparing contract values to allocated budget, the savings rate in the maritime component was 13%, while the same rate in the terrestrial component was 30%.** Another difference was the tendering method applied: the electronic bidding used in the terrestrial component may also explain the higher rate of savings.

Three features of the procurement process in Romania contributed to the efficiency of the investment:

- The tenders were not limited to bidders from the European Union (unlike similar tenders under the Schengen Facility in Bulgaria);
- The 1000-ton surveillance sea ship was built in Romania by the Damen Shipyards Group;
- Electronic bidding was applied for the terrestrial component of the measure.

The selection criterion for all tenders was lowest price.

In the maritime mobility component, in only one of the four major tenders there was more than one qualified bidder (contract 2, for 3 maritime patrol and surveillance vessels). Out of 5 bidders for the patrol vessels (contract 4), four bidders were disqualified. It should be noted, however, that the one bidder which was considered also had the lowest initial offer. In the case of contract 2, where two bidders were qualified to bid, one of the bidders, Intermarine SPA, filed a complaint that the specifications were too restrictive and the selection commission was biased. The

National Council for Solving Complaints rejected the complaint. In this case again the winning bidder's offer was actually the lowest one. One bidder (out of two), Marine Alutech OV AB, was disqualified in the tender for river patrol boats (contract 3). The reason for disqualification was failure to meet several requirements of the technical specifications. The winning bid was a little higher than the disqualified one (by 2%). Overall, this suggests that in spite of restricted competition the cost effectiveness of the measure was not impaired.

In the terrestrial mobility component, only one bidder was disqualified (out of a total number of 15 bidders for the 5 contracts awarded) for exceeding the maximum budget allocated. The availability of competing bids in all but one of the tenders, combined with the electronic bidding procedure, resulted in **significant savings compared to the allocated budgets**, with the winning bid in the tender for town vehicles offering to carry out the work for less than 50% of the maximum allocated budget.

The types of equipment acquired by the various contracts, the allocated budget and contract value, as well as the number of qualified and total bidders for each contract and the winning bidder are presented in Table 12.

Table 12: Major tenders for the maritime and terrestrial component

Contracts	Allocated budget	Contract Value	% of allocated budget	Bidders qualified (total bidders)	Winning bidder
Maritime mobility					
Surveillance sea vessel (1)	30,000,000	24,750,000	83%	1 (1)	Damen Shipyards
Maritime patrol and intervention vessels (3)	30,000,000	26,914,269	90%	2 (2)	Israel Shipyards Ltd
River Patrol boats (5)	7,500,000	7,195,000	96%	1 (2)	Istanbul Denizcilik Gemi Insa
Patrol vessels (20)	3,500,000	3,107,400	89%	1 (5)	Tehnomont Brodogradiliste Pula d.o.o
Terrestrial mobility					
Off-road vehicles (426)	19,084,800	18,347,811	96%	1 (2)	Radacini Motor S.R.L.
Town vehicles (402)	15,485,000	7,393,099	48%	3 (3)	Porsche Romania
Mini-buses (250)	10,425,000	6,096,271	58%	2 (2)	Porsche Romania
Auto-special vehicles for dogs transport (50)	2,135,000	1,234,000	58%	5 (5)	Casa Auto S.R.L.
ATVs (150)	1,845,000	1,799,524	98%	3(3)	C&I Eurotrans XXI S.R.L.

Source: CFCU (Romania)

Overall, the investment under the maritime and terrestrial mobility measure was carried out in an efficient way and the contracts were awarded to the lowest price bidder. It should be noted that for the two highest value contracts (for the 1000-ton surveillance sea ship and for the 3 maritime patrol and intervention vessels) the initially allocated budget turned out too low and the first tender procedures for each of them was cancelled. Even after the allocated budget was raised to 30M EUR for both (from 25M for the first one and 21M for the second one), the two tenders attracted only three bids in total.

A comparison with acquisitions of vehicles under Schengen Facility I reveals that the unit prices for similar vehicles purchased by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are comparable with the prices achieved in the tender procedures in Romania:

Table 13: Price comparison of terrestrial vehicles acquired under Schengen Facility I and Schengen Facility II

Type of vehicles	ROMANIA		ESTONIA		LATVIA		LITHUANIA	
	Units	Unit price EUR	Units	Unit price EUR	Units	Unit price EUR	Units	Unit price EUR
Off-road vehicles	426	43,070	-	-	22	32,806	180	31,844
ATVs	150	11,997	17	10,150	-	-	-	-
Town vehicles/light vehicles	402	18,391	25	11,631	131	15,997	21	18,959
Mini-buses/mini-vans	250	24,385	-	-	73	58,469	23	20,966

Source: Schengen Facility I Comprehensive Reports for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Schengen Facility II Comprehensive Report for Romania.

A comparison of maritime and river vessels acquired in Bulgaria under Schengen Facility II (provided also in case study BG1) is reproduced here. Due to differences in the size of acquired ships and boats, the unit prices vary more significantly than in the case of terrestrial vehicles:

Table 14: Price comparison of maritime and river vessels acquired in Bulgaria and Romania under SF II

Type of vessels	ROMANIA		BULGARIA	
	Units	Unit price (EUR)	Units	Unit price (EUR)
Surveillance sea vessel	1	24,750,000	1	14,255,000
Maritime patrol and intervention vessels	3	8,971,423	2	3,945,000
River Patrol boats	5	1,439,000	6	599,013
Patrol vessels	20	155,370	2	630,013

Source: Schengen Facility II Comprehensive Reports for Bulgaria and for Romania.

Operational

The coordinated activities of the patrol and intervention ships with the SCOMAR system and the OPV guarantee the observation and inspection of a much larger number of targets with at significantly smaller costs.

Similarly, the complex observation system at the Danube and the Danube Delta, SCOD, contributes to the more efficient spending of resources for the control of the river borders.

In terms of fuel consumption, the provided data makes it difficult to assess how if the introduction of new vessels has contributed to a more efficient use of resources. The difficulty also stems from the fact that the cost cuts severely limited the fuel consumption in 2012 (almost by half) compared to the 2011.

Table 15. Fuel consumption by year

Year	Gasoline consumption	Diesel consumption	Total
2009	222,200	771,800	994,000
2010	298,400	857,000	1,155,400

2011	276,600	1,228,800	1 505,400
2012	191,500	680,700	872,200
2013	182,900	1,000,300	1 183,200

Source: Romanian Border Guard

The situation with the vehicles seems to be different than the one with the vessels. Logically, the increase in the number of vehicles led to an overall increased consumption of fuel. Yet the crisis of 2012 did not affect the usage in the same way it did on the use of fuel for maritime and river vessels. The efficiency achieved therefore through the purchase of new vehicles with greater fuel efficiency is difficult to assess, as detailed data on the fuel consumption of all vehicles was not provided. Data provided for fuel consumption of the vehicles purchased under the Schengen Facility showed great variation in the fuel consumption per 100 km – in many areas it was consistently twice as high as in other areas. In addition, in many areas the fuel consumption was more than double than the consumption defined by the technical specifications. For instance, Iveco Massif fuel consumption in many areas was on average 12 l / 100 km, which is close to the manufacturer specifications of 10 l / 100 km, while in other border police areas the consumption was consistently over 20 litres per 100 km, which seems implausible (unless there are some very different patrolling pattern).

Table 16. Fuel consumption of all vehicles by vehicles

	Gasoline	Diesel	Total	Value (RON)
2010	324 000	1 520	1 844	7 191 600
2011	377 000	1 492	1 869	8 036 700
2012	476 000	1 527	2 003	9 213 800
2013	345 000	1 415	1 760	9 504 000

Source: Romanian Border Guard

Complementarity

Maritime and river

The investment under the sea and land mobility Schengen Facility measure was complementary both to previous investments, mainly the Phare Programme, and to investments from the External Borders Fund.

The investments in maritime mobility are summarised in Table 17 and Table 18:

Table 17: Sea mobility investments for the Romanian Border Police from the Phare Programme

Phare Project	Description	Quantity
PHARE 1999 - RO 9907-01-02/01	Fast intervention boats HARPOON 550 OPEN	47

PHARE 2000 RO0006.16.01.03	Fast intervention boats HARPOON 550 OPEN	17
PHARE 2000 RO0006.16.01.03	River patrol boats 500 CLASS	5
PHARE 2002 000586.04.14.01.02	/ Boats for harbour surveillance and control RODMAN R1120	12
PHARE 2002 000586.04.14.01.02	/ Inspection and rescue boats SLP 5400 (RIB)	10
PHARE 2002 000586.04.14.01.02	/ Air-cushion vehicles HTI 425 (hovercraft)	6
PHARE 2002 000586.04.14.01.02	/ Outboard engine boats rr 4.2	20
PHARE 2004/016772.03.04.03.01	River patrol boats P66	5
PHARE 2004/016772.03.04.03.01	River patrol boats ARVOR 215R	50

Source: Phare Programmes for Romania (1999, 2000, 2002, 2004-2006).

Per information presented from the Romanian Border Police, in 2005-2006, the German government donated 3 maritime surveillance ships type P-157, and 2 outboard engine boats type MF 580.

In terms of complementarity with the External Borders Fund, in 2010-2011, the Romanian Border Police fleet upgraded some of the equipment purchased under the Phare programme (**Table 18: Sea mobility investments for the Romanian Border Police from the EBF Table 18**).

Table 18: Sea mobility investments for the Romanian Border Police from the EBF


EBF Project	Description	Quantity
RO-EBF/2010/P2/A7/01 and RO-EBF/2011/P2/A6/02	Upgrading of the fast intervention boats HARPOON 550 OPEN	60
RO-EBF/2011/P2/A6/01	Upgrading of the propulsion system of sea ships P157	4

Source: Romanian Border Police

The investment in maritime vessels is complementary to the development of the Romanian integrated surveillance system for the maritime border SCOMAR. The command and control system SCOMAR utilises IT&C, radar and optoelectronic technologies. It is a national project ensuring the cooperation of three Romanian ministries: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Development, and Ministry of Transport. Through SCOMAR, Romania participates in the international cooperation on border control. SCOMAR was developed with funding from the Phare Programme⁷ and national funds and was launched in April 2009. The coverage provided by SCOMAR is presented on **Figure 6**:

Figure 6: The SCOMAR surveillance system

⁷ Phare 2003 programme included a component "Integrated Observation and Control System on Maritime Traffic at the Black Sea Coast - Phase 1; Phare 2004 – Phase 2; Phare 2005 – Final Phase, as well as some national co-financing. The total cost was 24.6 million.



Source: Romanian Border Police

The investment of river patrol and surveillance vessel was in turn complementary to the Danube River integrated system for surveillance of river vessels, named SCOD. SCOD is integrated with the System of Management, Construction and Naval Tourism on the Danube RO-RIS, both by a real data transmission about the trade ships itinerary. The system covers the Danube River and the Danube Delta, and includes sensor stations on the river, infrastructure of communications, centres of command and control, naval, terrestrial and air intervention units. Parts of this system were developed under the Phare Programme, while additional surveillance components of the system were purchased to develop the *Caras-Severin* section of SCOD under the Schengen Facility⁸.

The development of the SCOD system itself was preceded by other relevant projects such as Phare project 2005/017-553.03.04.02.04 *Communication facilities for surveillance on the Danube River*, fifteen towers/ pillars were built along the Serbian border for supporting sensors and communication equipment.

Finally, under the External Borders Fund, money has been allocated for "preventive and corrective maintenance" for the offshore patrol vessel OPV 6610 and for three patrol and intervention vessels SHALDAG MKIV.

Terrestrial mobility

The vehicles acquired under the Schengen Facility are complementary to acquisition under the 2005 Phare Programme and donations from the German government. In 2005, the Romanian Border Police received through the Phare Programme the following vehicles:

⁸ Objective 1, RO-FSCH 23 Upgrading Romanian Border Police capacity of surveillance and control of European Union external borders

- 102 Opel Astra cars;
- 66 Nissan Terrano intervention vehicles;
- 152 ATV motorcycles with 4 wheels (Roush).

Project title	Number of vehicles	Type of vehicle
Phare 1999 RO 9907.01.02/01	122	Nissan Terrano
Phare 2000 RO 0006.16.01.03	47	Nissan Terrano
	36	intervention vehicles
Phare 2002 RO 2002/000-586.04.14.01.02	165	off-road intervention vehicles
	152	motorcycles


Per information presented by the Romanian Border Police, in 2005 the German Federal Ministry of Interior donated 6 Lada Niva vehicles.

Sustainability

Maintenance

Maintenance for the equipment acquired through the Schengen Facility, both for terrestrial vehicles and for sea and river vessels, has been secured from the national budget and from the EBF. Overall, the investment in terrestrial and maritime mobility has been sustainable in terms of maintenance, thanks to 1) the adequate funding; and 2) the use of a dedicated repair facility for the maintenance of all vessels operated by the Romanian Border Police.

Table 19. Problems with vehicle maintenance (long repair time, lack of spare parts, failure of certain features)



Source: Survey of drivers

Terrestrial mobility

Maintenance cost for all 1,337 terrestrial vehicles acquired under the SF for 2012 and 2013 amounted to 1,438,869 EUR (per data provided by the Romanian Border Police). These expenses included 575,593 EUR for technical inspection, and 863,276 EUR for recurring and unforeseen repairs. All maintenance expenses were covered by the national budget. It should be noted that the vehicles are not

covered by full insurance but only by third party liability insurance. Per comments from the Romanian

Border Police, the small number of accidents does not justify financially the purchase of full insurance for the vehicles. At the same time, this represents a risk as local sources of financing for the units where accidents may occur would not be able to cover the repair costs. The survey indicated that 16% of the drivers surveyed have experienced some kind of problem with their vehicle.

Maritime and river mobility maintenance

The maintenance of the sea ships and river boats is performed at the Naval Repair Base in Braila. The Braila repair base is state-owned and dedicated to the needs of the Romanian Border Police. Only in cases where the technical capacities of the repair base are exceeded (e.g. docking of certain vessels, repair works at a vessel's body or of complex equipment), maintenance services are contracted with commercial repair shops.

One of the ways that staff of the repair base increased their capacity to repair the newly acquired vessels under the Schengen facility is that mechanics from the Repair Base were allowed to monitor on a regular basis the construction of the ships, especially of the OPV, and were trained on the job as part of the procurement process. As a result, a greater number of repairs could be done in-house.

During the site visit to the Repair Base, one of the Schengen purchased SNR river boats was docked for repairs. The captain of the boat and the boat mechanic stayed permanently on the boat and witnessed all repairs for several weeks in order to be able to provide better maintenance and to carry out preventive care of the boat.

The Romanian Border Police stated that the contracts for preventive and corrective maintenance for the offshore patrol vessel OPV 6610 and for three patrol and intervention vessels SHALDAG MKIV are being finalised (as of March 2014). Financing for these contracts was provided from the External Borders Fund.

During the warranty period of the vessels, a total of 667 technical problems have been identified, of which 432 have been resolved on time (within the 30-day period stipulated in the warranty contracts). The total number of days ships not in operation due to longer maintenance work has been 228, with 208 days for the SNR 17 (river patrolling boats), and 20 days for the Onix (intervention and patrolling boats). The table below summarizes the maintenance records for the vessels acquired under the Schengen Facility in the warranty period.

Table 20: Technical problems and downtime for vessels during the warranty period

Vessels	Number of units	Number of technical problems	Problems corrected on time	Number of days out of service
Maritime surveillance vessel (OPV)	1	120	120	-
Maritime patrolling and intervention ships (Shaldag)	3	335	128	
River patrolling boats (SNR17)	5	51	29	208
Intervention and patrolling boats (Onix)	20	55	51	20
Landing pontoons (Navproiect)	3	22	22	-
Surveillance points (Navproiect)	6	44	44	-
Total		627	395	228

Source: Romanian Border police

Training

Table 21. Certification of Coast Guard Staff for the use of vessels purchased under the Schengen facility

SHALDAG MK IV	2010	2011	2012	2013
NG CONSTANȚA	18	3	3	2
NG MANGALIA	11	0	4	3
NG SULINA	12	0	2	0
TOTAL - 58	41	3	9	5

OPV 6610	2010	2011	2012	2013
NG CONSTANȚA	12	6	0	35
TOTAL- 53	12	6	0	35

ONIX 26 SD	2011	2012	2013
BPC ISACCEA	4	22	25
BPS PARDINA	8	10	19
BPS CHILIA	13	27	33
TOTAL - 161	25	59	77

SNR 17	2011	2012	2013
BPS TULCEA	3	3	4
BPS TULCEA	3	6	8
TOTAL - 27	6	9	12

The adequate training and certification of crews is key to the effective and sustainable use of the equipment that has been acquired. The data presented by the Coast Guard as well as the interviews during the site visits to Constanta and Galati showed that on average, there was intensive training and certification of the personnel right from the start when the vessels were acquired. With the increased level of financing some of the ships gradually started to be used at their full capacity, and additional crew members had to be trained. The majority of OPV crew, for instance, was only trained in 2013 when the ships began to be used for longer missions. Additional staff was also certified for the use of the ONIX 26 SD.

The training of the terrestrial vehicles staff is slightly different not only because certification is not required, but also because some of the vehicles were just standard passenger vehicles or replaced vehicles where staff was already trained. Nevertheless, the 84% of the survey respondents indicated that they have received training; 12% stated that they did not receive training but they did not need it. Only 4% responded that they did not receive training but it would have been good to have some.

Impact

The impact on border security through the investments is difficult to quantify for a number of reasons:

- The main intended impact on border security by the measure is preventive. Smugglers and facilitators quickly find out about new capabilities. Therefore reduction of detections is a logical outcome of the investments.
- Increased migration pressures on the other hand may create an emergency situation and contribute to a greater number of detections. Such is the trend observed as a result of the Syrian crisis. For the first time ever migration pressure via sea has been observed in Romania (mostly Syrian or Afghani migrants arriving in fishing vessels from Turkey). During the site visit to Romania, a presentation detailing a number of operations showed convincingly that the use of SCOMAR and patrolling vessels has had the intended impact on preventing irregular migration by intercepting all cases. Attempts, such as a recent one on 6 February 2014, to explore a perceived vulnerability and land the irregular migrants exactly on the border with Bulgaria, was also thwarted as the operational mechanisms within the European Patrol Network allowed for quick communication with the Bulgarian Border Police to apprehend the fleeing facilitators.

Table 22. Detected landings of migrants via sea in 2013 / 2014 (Jan-Feb).

DATE	MIGRANTS	FACILITATORS
------	----------	--------------

06.07.2013	33 – SYR	2 – TUR
27.07.2013	26 – SYR	2 – TUR
11.09.2013	20 – SYR / 10 AFG	1 – TUR
28.12.2013	28 – AFG	1 – TUR
06.02.2014	5 – SOM / 3 – SYR	1 – TUR
Total	125	7

Source: Romanian Coast Guard


Table 23. Illegal crossings of the blue border (at external border)

Zone		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Maritime:	Territorial waters	0	1	2	4	2	3
Maritime:	Contiguous zone	0	0	0	0	1	2
Danube river		11	12	15	22	26	33

Source: Romanian Border Police

An indirect way of measuring the impact is to ask users of the equipment about their experience and perceived impact on their work. During the site visits to Constanta and Galati, all captains and crew members were extremely satisfied with the new vessels, as they entirely changed their working conditions. The survey of Border Guards using newly acquired terrestrial vehicles showed similar results.


Figure 7. Change in working conditions after the acquisition of the vehicle



Source: Survey of Romanian Border Guards

The number of illegal border crossings has fluctuated significantly, due to factors in third countries. The migration pressure has been most intense at the Serbian border in 2011 and 2012, and has subsided in 2013. It is not possible to establish a direct connection between the number of illegal border crossings and the impact of the Schengen Facility measures.

Figure 8: Illegal border crossings at the external borders



Source: Romanian Border Police

RO 2 - Objective 1, Modernization and re-configuration of BCPs to fit the new and future needs of surveillance and control


Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, including technical specifications, decisions of the tender selection commissions (CFCU); comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government;
Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Experts from the Schengen Directorate at MIA • Deputy Chief of the Iasi Territorial Border Police Inspectorate; • Romanesti Post Chief • Chief of IT and Communications Bureau of the Iasi Territorial Border Police Inspectorate; • Director of the Logistics Department of the Border Police General Inspectorate
Site visits	Romanesti BCP
Key indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvement of working conditions at the renovated BP headquarters and BCPs (it will be measured by the number and categories of reconstructions such as number of new rest facilities, computer equipment rooms, dog kennels etc.) • Increased effectiveness and efficiency of BP officers and employees in renovated facilities. (a suggested measurement has been staff-turnover) • Faster processing times at borders (so far no quantitative data has been presented by Romanian authorities to support analysis that shows if processing times have been reduced)

Key Findings

- The project included the design and reconstruction of regional border police headquarters and border crossing points.
- A total of 60 contracts (29 for design and 31 for construction) were completed.
- Work at 8 locations were not finalized by the end of the implementation period of the Schengen Facility. Therefore, out of the allocated €44 million (€40.6 million intended for construction), only €32.4 million were found eligible by the EC auditors. As a consequence, additional funding from national sources helped complete the projects.
- The investment has transformed the majority of external BCPs and complemented other investments previously made to modernise river, sea, and airport BCPs.
- Overall, competition in the tendering procedures was limited; as a result, in most cases, the tender procedures did not achieve best value for money.

Background and description

The measure involved the renovation of 31 BP headquarters and BCP facilities (see Figure 2 on next page), most of which were built in the period 1960-1975 and were in poor condition. The Romanian government in 2006 had identified 66 BCPs that needed to be refurbished to correspond to Schengen standards. Indicative of the condition of the facilities is the data about 20 scheduled reconstructions of BCPs at the time provided by the Romanian authorities to the European Commission (Figure 9). The note indicated that 9 BCPs needed rehabilitation of between 90% and 100% of the facility's infrastructure, while no more than 4 out of the 20 BCPs at the external borders only required minor reconstruction (between 10% and 20%) of the facility.



The alignment of Romania's border crossings with the Schengen requirements was a long process that started several years before accession of Romania to the EU. At the time, Romania had 16 civil airports, 15 of them international, which had permanent border control points of the Border Police and customs offices. The Romanian government earmarked in the Schengen Action Plan €15.7 million for implementing measures which would adapt the airports' infrastructure to the Schengen needs. The BCPs at a

number of Danube River (Tulcea, Moldova Vece, Orsova, Calarasi) and Black Sea (Constanta) ports were reconstructed between 2005 and 2007, mostly with national funds, and thus brought up to Schengen standards. No investment, however, was carried out at land border BCPs – this will be confirmed with the Romanian authorities. The Schengen Facility therefore provided much needed funds for extensive reconstructions focusing on such land-border BCPs. The contracts under this measure included (Table 24): technical design of planned works, refurbishment of roofs and terraces, repair and replacement of the carpentry, setting up of independent heating installations, construction of garages for special vehicles for surveillance and intervention, connections to the gas, water-sewing, and electric networks. The main objectives of the reconstructions were:

- To rehabilitate headquarters for the Border Police units, which will correspond to the operational conditions required under the Schengen Catalogue, especially at the European Union external border
- To increase the effectiveness of border surveillance and border checks by improving the working conditions for Border Police, and providing conditions for accommodation of new equipment

receiving additional renovations of their heating systems, garage facilities, or dog kennels (Table 24).

Table 24. Summary of types of reconstruction activities

Activities performed:	Fuel deposit rehabilitated	Fuel pump	Outdoor works	Heating system modernized	Garages for special border police vehicles	Paddock for dogs	New headquarter
Total	5	2	16	6	8	4	3

Source: Comprehensive Report, p.33-34

The measure brought about the following effects:

- Separate interview rooms were built to bring the facility up to the Schengen standards for treatment of persons brought for second-line questioning;
- Control booths were redesigned to meet the Schengen border code as well as to provide for faster processing of traffic. Prior to the measure, these BCPs were not constructed and arranged in a way that inward and outward flows of vehicles and travellers could be effectively segregated, sorted and processed rapidly and effectively by the RBP and other border management authorities.
- Cooperation with customs and other border agencies was facilitated by providing common meeting rooms, as well as facilities for joint inspections.
- Some BCP's capacity was significantly expanded (e.g. the visited Romanesti BCP could accommodate 80 officers, up from about 20).

Redesign of the regional BG headquarters included:

- Special condition rooms for accommodating new technical equipment. In older buildings there were occasions where leakages damaged technical equipment
- Buildings were from 1960s and 1970s did not satisfied the overall security conditions under new national law on conditions for handling classified information
- Each sector was provided with special conditions for technical equipment
- The electrical systems were upgraded to accommodate the new surveillance and operational systems
- New garage facilities were constructed to accommodate additional or new types of vehicles.
- New facilities for service dogs were constructed to provide better care
- Local command centres
- Detention rooms, which didn't exist before, had to be designed with respect of rules for humane treatment of detained persons
- For each type of department, special controlled access areas and related surveillance systems were installed

- Fire-alarm systems were installed
- Special change rooms were included, as they were mostly absent before
- Hot-water showers and bathroom facilities were installed, as they were mostly absent before

Figure 10. The Moravita Border Crossing Point between Romania and Serbia – before and after



Source: Border Police (Romania)

Figure 11. The Halmeu Border Crossing Point on Romania – Ukraine border – before and after



Source: Border Police (Romania)

Efficiency

The issue of efficiency is controversial amongst stakeholders. Interviewees from construction companies that participated in the works, who were approached as part of prior evaluations of the Schengen facility highlighted the following problems¹⁰:

- Reinforcement works, essential for old buildings, were not always foreseen,
- The level of damage of existing parts of the buildings or materials was not always properly assessed by designers.
- It would have been more adequate to commission the technical design together with the Works in a single contract (“Design & Build”), as this

¹⁰ CPD – NTSN CONECT – Pluriconsult Consortium, *Evaluation of the Implementation process of the Indicative Plan objectives of the Schengen Facility 2007 – 2009*, 15 November 2010.

would probably have resulted in smaller discrepancies between the real needs, the tender, and the realisation.

- coordination problems between the technical design and the implementation of the renovation works delayed the completion (e.g. in some facilities renovation works had to be re-designed and redone due to faults in the technical design).

Interviews with Border Guard officials for this case study indicated that a number of such criticisms were made while construction was still ongoing. They were largely seen as a classic attempt by construction contractors to increase the amounts of their contracts by claiming “unforeseen” conditions. Interviewees indicated that a number of construction companies attempted to win the contracts by offering a low price, and later attempted to increase their prices by claiming faults in the design. These attempts were retorted by ensuring that proper clauses in the contracts were included to prevent such possibilities and some companies were informed that no option of increasing the costs existed.

Analysis of the data from the tender procedures (Table 25) points to a number of problematic issues:

- Only a minority of tender procedures (11 out of 31) could be considered competitive enough to provide best value for money. The majority of tender procedures either had no competition (e.g. in 13 of 31 procedures, only one bidder qualified, while all other were dismissed on technical grounds; in four procedures only one bidder even submitted a bid).
- This conclusion is further supported by two facts:
 - At least 609 606 euro were lost as opposed to a scenario where always the lowest bidder would have been awarded the contract
 - On average, the 11 bids that could be considered competitive achieved a lower price (64% of the indicative price), while the non-competitive bids averaged 74% of the indicative price. It could be argued that competitive bidding could have lowered the overall cost by as much as €2.8 million.
 - The significant difference between contracted and indicative costs

Table 25. Analysis of data from tendering procedures

No of Contract	Indicative amount	Contracted amount	% of costs not recognised	Difference with lowest bid	No. of bidders	No. of bidders qualified	C / N C	% of indicative price
No 29: RO FSCH 19.1.2.2 LOT 1	675,000	463,755.14	0.0%	-	10	2	1	0.69
No 30: RO FSCH 19.1.2.2 LOT 2	585,000	247,036.92	0.0%	-	9	1	1	0.42
No 31: RO FSCH 19.1.2.2 LOT 3	540,000	350,970.14	82.6%	-	5	2	1	0.65
No 32: RO FSCH 19.1.2.2 LOT 4	702,000	504,177.83	0.0%	138,617	8	1	-	0.72

No of Contract	Indicative amount	Contracted amount	% of costs not recognized	Difference with lowest bid	No. of bidders	No. of bidders qualified	C / N C	% of indicative price
No 33: RO FSCH 19.1.2.3	1,530,000	697,823.27	0.0%		7	1	-	0.46
No 37: RO FSCH 19.1.2.5 LOT 1	3,134,000	2,658,802.93	1.0%	-	3	3	1	0.85
No 38: RO FSCH 19.1.2.5 LOT 2	1,180,000	872,247.61	0.0%	122,253	3	1	0	0.74
No 39: RO FSCH 19.1.2.5 LOT 3	1,250,000	1,002,985.33	0.0%	-	1	1	0	0.80
No 40: RO FSCH 19.1.2.5 LOT 4	1,526,000	1,177,251	0.0%	27,361	4	1	0	0.77
No 41: RO FSCH 19.1.2.6 LOT 1	1,150,000	722,379	0.0%	85,075	6	4	0	0.63
No 42: RO FSCH 19.1.2.6 LOT 2	1,900,000	1,186,605.36	0.0%	64,218	5	2	0	0.62
No 43: RO FSCH 19.1.2.7 LOT 1	1,755,000	1,192,846	11.4%	-	3	1	1	0.68
No 44: RO FSCH 19.1.2.7 LOT 2	2,000,000	1,077,513	38.8%	-	4	4	1	0.54
No 45: RO FSCH 19.1.2.7 LOT 3	900,000	679,202.13	0.0%	-	3	3	1	0.75
No 46: RO FSCH 19.1.2.7 LOT 4	930,000	740,067.07	0.0%	140,807	4	1	0	0.80
No 47: RO FSCH 19.1.2.7 LOT 5	1,000,000	765,464	6.5%	-	3	2	1	0.77
No 48: RO FSCH 19.1.2.7 LOT 6	1,850,000	1,053,357	39.4%	-	3	2	1	0.57
No 49: RO FSCH 19.1.2.8 LOT 1	2,500,000	2,483,324.72	0.1%	-	1	1	0	0.99
No 50: RO FSCH 19.1.2.8 LOT 2	2,500,000	2,128,835.78	0.4%	-	1	1	0	0.85
No 51: RO FSCH 19.1.2.8 LOT 3	2,500,000	2,396,558.51	0.0%	-	2	1	0	0.96
No 52: RO FSCH 19.1.2.8 LOT 4	2,500,000	2,475,000.11	0.0%	-	2	2	0	0.99
No 54: RO FSCH 19.1.2.10 LOT 1	1,700,000	907,711.03	1.9%	-	5	4	-	0.53
No 55: RO FSCH 19.1.2.10 LOT 2	1,850,000	1,017,039.01	5.0%	31,275	6	5	1	0.55
No 56: RO FSCH 19.1.2.11	3,140,000	1,940,592.87	2.7%	-	3	2	1	0.62
Total				609,606				

Sources: Based on tender documentation provided by CFCU of the Ministry of Finance

Complementarity

The reconstruction of the border crossing points has been complementary to a number of other Romanian government-funded investments (such as the reconfiguration of air and sea BPCs), as well as PHARE funded projects such as 2004/016-772.03.04/02.C4

which provided feasibility studies and design of BCPs. Additional BCPs have been renovated under the External Borders Fund (6 completed and 7 ongoing).

The reconstruction of the BCPs in a sense is complementary to numerous projects funded either under PHARE, the Schengen Facility or the EBF that involved the installation or acquisition of:

- surveillance (the Integrated Border Security System),
- communication equipment (stationary TETRA posts), or
- other IT systems (N-SIS, VIS) equipment,
- mobility (vehicles)
- first / second line detection equipment, etc.

The reconstructed BCPs and headquarter buildings provide the basic infrastructure that is needed for storage and proper maintenance of this equipment.

Impact

The project aspired to have “a huge impact” and had the goal of “changing the control concept in BCP and in surveillance at external borders”¹¹. The envisaged impacts included¹²:

- a) “ensuring a proper working environment for the border police staff, better conditions for the preservation of the logistic and technical means”.
- b) improving the passengers flows,
- c) fighting against crossborder crime
- d) overall performance in terms of costs / resources / results
- e) decreasing the staff fluctuation

The multiannual programme also expected improvement in the following parameters¹³:

- f) Efficient internal coordination at all levels;
- g) Information exchange between competent authorities (border guard, customs, police, judicial authorities, prosecutors);
- h) Measures to prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime inside the territory by enhanced search, checks and surveillance;
- i) Measures to enable the repatriation of irregular migrants in accordance with national law.
- j) Improvement of working conditions at the renovated BP headquarters and BCPs;
- k) Increased effectiveness and efficiency of BP officers and employees in renovated facilities.

The above mentioned aspirations are difficult to quantify and many of them depend on various external factors, as the infrastructure has only indirect impact on them (parameters c, h, I, f, and g). The improvement of passenger flows, in terms of measuring queuing times and processing times, is not being done on a regular basis by the Romanian Border Police and it is difficult to prove. The decreasing of staff fluctuation or the lower performance costs are

¹¹ Romania Annual Schengen Facility Indicative Programme 2009, p. 40

¹² Romania Annual Schengen Facility Indicative Programme 2009, p. 40

¹³ Romania Annual Schengen Facility Indicative Programme 2009, p. 40

difficult to substantiate because the Schengen Facility implementation period coincided with a period of significant cost and staff cuts.

Interviews with Border Police officers at the Border Police headquarters in Bucharest and at Romanesti BCP indicated that thanks to the renovations, the working conditions and the functionality of border police facilities had been drastically improved, in compliance with the Schengen Code. The renovations and addition of new facilities has also contributed to improvements in the organization of activities at the BCPs and thus have had a positive impact on the capacity of Romanian Border Police to protect the external borders.

Statistical data on the regular passenger and vehicle traffic, and the illegal border crossings at the external borders with Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine cannot provide a straight forward proof of the impact of the measure but illustrate the intensity and dynamics of the cross border traffic:

Table 26: Statistical data on passenger and vehicle traffic at Romania's external borders

MOLDOVA	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Passenger flow	3355134	3552753	4105243	3967271	4137449
Vehicles flow	1189208	1148717	1370671	1247003	1323973
Crimes	1195	1386	1465	1486	1876
Illegal crossings attempts	381	419	305	348	215
Facilitators	41	121	25	10	13

SERBIA	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Passenger flow	3489723	3185861	2971615	3081892	2888971
Vehicles flow	1411576	1180626	1057153	1025486	972468
Crimes	513	724	1317	1387	830
Illegal crossings attempts	38	51	1164	1806	68
Facilitators	-	-	13	30	10

UKRAINE	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Passenger flow	3209343	2918266	2290678	2431347	2554671
Vehicles flow	1425065	1150560	1037565	1037111	1015221
Crimes	1281	1631	1957	2082	2167
Illegal crossings attempts	273	226	229	234	257
Facilitators	9	8	8	3	4

Source: Romanian Border police

RO 3 – SURVEILLANCE VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT: Objective 1

Key Findings

The measure was relevant as it addressed Romania's needs to enhance the surveillance capacity at the external borders and to complete the surveillance system on the Danube (Caras-Severin).

The objectives of the measure were achieved through delivery of the purchased equipment and vehicles and integrating them in the surveillance resources used by the Romanian Border Police.

The funds were spent in an efficient way, as indicated by the two tender procedures reviewed: both involved competitive bids, the contracts were awarded to the lowest price bidder, and significant savings compared to the allocated budgets were generated.

The measure complemented a number of projects designed to strengthen the surveillance capacity at the external borders, including interconnection with other surveillance systems like SCOMAR, SCOD and RoRIS. The complete integration of the existing surveillance systems is being further developed with national funds.

The investment is sustainable in terms of maintenance and training of the personnel using the equipment.

The main impact of the measure is the improved mobility and surveillance capacities of Border Police at the external borders. The number of patrols needed to for surveillance of the Romanian-Serbian border has been reduced significantly (in some sectors, from 6 to 2 patrols daily).

List of data collection sources

Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, including technical specifications, decisions of the tender selection commission; comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; mission reports by the EC; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government.
Interviews	Border Police Headquarters group meeting, Deputy Head of the Romanian Border Police, Head of Galati Border Region, Head of Galati Border Police Territorial Service, Drivers / surveillance officers Land Rover Surveillance vehicle (Galati and Romanesti).
Site visits	24 February 2014 – Romanian Border Police HQ (Bucharest); 1 April 2014 - Galati County police inspectorate.
Survey	A survey was distributed among border police officers who operate the special surveillance vehicles. 24 filled in questionnaires were returned.
Key indicators	Operational data on utilization of vehicles and equipment ⁴ Improved surveillance coverage of the external borders Competitive tendering procedures Maintenance and training of end users of vehicles and equipment

Description and background

The equipment acquired through this measure was not included in the initial Indicative Programme and the Action Plans. The measure was one of the so called stand-by, or envelope projects. These projects were to be implemented in case funds became available as a result of savings from the priority projects included in the Indicative

Programme. Thanks to several tendering procedures in which the awarded contracts were significantly below the allocated budgets, the envelope projects were implemented in 2009-2010.

The envelope project (RO-FSCH 23) included a variety of equipment for border checks and border surveillance. The table below provides brief description of the 24 acquisition contracts under this measure. For the case study, we focused on the two highest value contracts, the special surveillance vehicles and the integrated surveillance system on the Danube in Caras-Severin.

Table 27: Equipment acquired under the measure (Objective 1, RO-FSCH 23)

Equipment acquired	Contract value (EUR)
59 special surveillance vehicles	10,507,015
Equipment for the integrated surveillance Caras-Severin	3,425,985
68 portable reading devices	307,360
261 fixed and 435 mobile document control devices	374,088
26 devices for detecting heart beat	677,300
19 CO2 detectors	55,765
32 Endoscopes	256,000
6 devices for recognition of registration plates	142,350
52 Tire piercing barriers	19,136
27 Portable thermal cameras with cooling and 52 portable thermal cameras without cooling	1,565,373
30 binoculars and 90 night vision goggles	352,320
44 power supply generators for mountain area, the Danube Delta	26,400
826 Traffic stamps	130,574
1328 Work stations and UPC	829,336
5000 masking suits (green camouflage)	408,710
1000 handcuffs and 5000 handcuff ports	50,900
5000 Flashlights with flashlight ports	123,900
5000 Batons and baton ports	98,000
1000 Teargas sprays and 5000 teargas spray ports	27,400
5000 Pistol holster with clip port	348,000
5000 Fines cards ports	29,750
150 Metal closets	20,059
Equipment for mobile communications and satellite tracking	695,595
67 IP phones, 12 IP cards, 120 licenses	117,800

The 59 special surveillance vehicles were deployed in eleven external border counties (see Figure 12: Land Rover special surveillance vehicle and Figure 13: Deployment of the 159 special surveillance vehicles). All vehicles were delivered between September and December 2010. Usually the vehicles are positioned between the stationary surveillance towers, thus complementing and enhancing the coverage of the green border and blue border areas.

Figure 12: Land Rover special surveillance vehicle



Figure 13: Deployment of the 159 special surveillance vehicles



Source: Romanian Border Police

The surveillance system in Caras-Severin (along the external border with Serbia) was operational by February 2011 (see Figure 14: Surveillance system along the Danube (Caras-Severin)).

Figure 14: Surveillance system along the Danube (Caras-Severin)



Relevance

The equipment acquired under this measure addresses the needs for enhancing the surveillance capacity of the Romanian Border Police at the external borders, as defined in the National Strategy of Integrated Management of the Romanian State Border for the Period 2007 – 2010 (28th March 2007).

The Romanian-Serbian border includes complex terrain with wooded mountainous areas along the river Danube. Before setting up the Caras-Severin surveillance system, surveillance at the Serbian border was performed through river and land patrols, requiring a high number of human resources. Furthermore, the operation of river and land patrols was dependent on weather conditions.

The special surveillance vehicles replaced older ones which were too costly to maintain and did not have thermo vision systems. Thus the new vehicles addressed the need for coverage of the green borders in all weather conditions and at night.

Effectiveness

The measures were effective as they achieved the objective outlined in the Indicative Programme to enhance the surveillance of the external borders.

The acquired special surveillance vehicles, Land Rover, are all-wheel drive, all-terrain vehicles, and are well suited for their intended use, surveillance of the green border. They provide visibility of 5-7 km, and the quality of the surveillance cameras is superior to the older ones (per interviews with drivers of Land Rover surveillance vehicles in Romanesti, March 2014, and Galati, April 2014).

The Caras-Severin surveillance system is covering approximately 166 km of the Romanian-Serbian border. It ensures a 24/7 surveillance of the traffic on the Danube river and adjacent areas and can operate in low visibility and independent of the weather conditions. The system includes infrastructure, equipment, IT applications and applies a geographical information system, receiving data from different types of sensors (radars, optoelectronic devices, other types of sensors). The Caras-Severin system sends information to the central Command and Coordination Center (CCC), giving a "Situation Awareness Picture" (SAP). The system provides in real time the operational information to the intervention teams, which leads to a higher efficiency in border management, at the same time required less human resources and lower operational costs.

Efficiency

The review of the tendering procedures for the special surveillance vehicles and for the Caras Severin surveillance system indicated that in both cases the tenders were competitive, with 9 bidders for the former (see Table 28) and 6 bidders for the latter (see Table 29). Selection criterion for both tenders was lowest price.

In the pre-selection process, 7 bidders in the special surveillance vehicles tender were disqualified due to lack of relevant experience or failure to respond to clarification questions. The winner, Pro Optica S.A., had the lowest price of all bidders anyway. Compared to the allocated budget, the tender generated savings of 4.8M EUR.

In the case of the Caras Severin surveillance system tender, there were 6 bidders. One bidder was disqualified due to lack of relevant experience. Again, the winner, Pro Optica S.A., had the lowest financial offer. Compared to the allocated budget, savings amounted to 0.8M EUR.

In both tenders the purchased equipment is highly specialised and it is difficult to compare to prevailing market prices. The number of competitive bids, the selection of the lowest bid and the savings compared to allocated budgets all indicate that the Schengen Facility funds were utilised in an efficient way.

Table 28: Tender for Special Surveillance Vehicles

Bidders	Financial Offer
INDRA SISTEMAS S.A.	13.275.000
INTERACTIVE SYSTEMS & BUSINESS CONSULTING S.R.L.	11.667.132
OPTRONIC INSTRUMENTS & PRODUCTS NV	12.884.208
PRO OPTICA S.A.	10.523.225
I.A.C. MANAGEMENT S.R.L.	14.435.335
OPTIX CO. Bulgaria	11.620.640
UTI SYSTEMS S.A.	12.272.000
ELECTROMAGNETICA S.A.	12.390.000
AGER BUSINESS TECH S.A.	11.637.337

Table 29: Tender for Caras-Severin Surveillance System

Bidders	Financial Offer
MOBILIS SRL	3.486.000
SIEMENS SRL	3.659.333
INDRA Sistemas SA	3.600.121
TeamNet International SA	3.687.000
Mira Telecom SRL	3.425.985
Centrul pentru Servicii de Radiocomunicatii SRL	4.081.778

Source: CFCU Romania

Operational efficiency

While hard data for the number of patrols and human resources deployed before and after the setting up of the Caras-Severin surveillance system was not available, the overall perception of border police officers was that the number of patrolling missions decreased, and a smaller number of border police officers performed more efficiently with the help of the surveillance system (an example was quoted that the average

daily patrols in a sector of the border decreased from 6 to 2 after the launching of the surveillance system).

Complementarity

The investment under this measure is part of the efforts to develop and enhance the integrated border system of Romania. It was complimentary to several related investments made both prior to and following the Schengen Facility.

The first phase for the communication system at the Danube was realised through a Phare 2005 project (finalised in February 2008, 2,568,876 EUR) and continued under the Schengen Facility. The general objective of the project was to set up a complex Multi Sensor Intelligence and surveillance system (MSISSD), in order to respond to the needs of control and surveillance of the Romanian- Serbian border.

The EBF was utilised for a maintenance contract for the Caras-Severin surveillance system, valid until 2016.

Sustainability

Maintenance

The surveillance system was setup and functional February 2011. Currently it is maintained by the IT experts of the border police territorial units.

A service contract for maintenance of the system was financed from the External Borders Fund in 2012. The service contract is valid until 2016.

The special surveillance vehicles are not covered by post warranty maintenance contract. The Border Police has signed a contract for repair and maintenance of the vehicles valid until 2015, after an open tender procedure. The contract covers the repairs for any of the equipment of the surveillance system. According to the Border Police registers, for 32 vehicles repairs to the surveillance systems were performed and for 27 vehicles, maintenance operations have been performed.

Training

The personnel using the surveillance system was trained in only one session, 10 persons, within the framework of the contract, covering use of IT application for MSISSD.

Training for the users of the vehicles was performed within the frame of the Schengen Facility contract, as part of the contract.


All respondents in the survey (24 out of 24) confirmed that they have received training for the use of the surveillance equipment installed on the special surveillance vehicles.

Impact

Data about the direct impact of the Caras-Severin surveillance system and the special surveillance vehicles is hard to produce. The perception of the overall impact of the measure is that they made the border control more effective and more efficient.


A survey among border police officers operating the special surveillance vehicles revealed that the majority of them (21 out of 24 respondents) receive between 6 and 10 signals per month requiring the deployment of the vehicles (see Figure 15).

Figure 15: Frequency of signals requiring special surveillance vehicles deployment




The impact of the special surveillance vehicles is clearly demonstrated by the survey. Asked if the number of detections of border violations by passengers and vehicles has changed after the acquisition of the surveillance vehicles, 18 out of 24 respondents in the survey claimed that the special surveillance vehicles contributed to a higher number of detections at the border (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: Impact on detections of border violations



The majority of respondents in the survey believed that while the regular traffic in their border area has intensified in the past several years (18 respondents out of 24), the attempts at irregular border crossing have slowed down (16 respondents out of 24).

Figure 17: Regular traffic and irregular border crossings



RO 4 - TETRA TERMINALS: Objective 2, Measure 2

List of data collection sources

Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, including technical specifications, decisions of the tender selection commission; contracts and correspondence between the beneficiary and the companies awarded contracts; comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; mission reports by the EC; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government.
Interviews	Project Manager from the Directorate for Communications and IT (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 2 Experts at the DCIT; Expert at the Schengen Directorate (Ministry of Internal Affairs, MIA); Department Head International Projects at the Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police (Bucharest); IT manager at the Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police (Bucharest); Deputy Head of the Galati County police inspectorate; C&IT Manager of the Galati County police inspectorate; Head of the commune police and 3 officers at the police station in Schela (Galati County); Head of the commune police and 3 officers at the police station in Sendreni (Galati County);
Site visits	24 February 2014 - General Directorate of Communications and IT of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; 25 February 2014 - Headquarters of the Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police; 1 April 2014 – Galati County police inspectorate 1 April 2014 – Schela Commune police station 1 April 2014 -- Sendreni commune police station
Survey	Survey of end users of TETRA terminals and of dispatchers operating TETRA terminals. Responses to the survey questionnaires were received from 150 end users and 25 dispatchers, covering all 27 counties which benefited from the measure (RO FSCH 1).
Key indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved connectivity and increased use of the N.SIS II through the newly installed TETRA equipment • Operational data on voice and data traffic • Maintenance of equipment and training of end users • Competitive tendering procedures

Key Findings

- The investment of TETRA terminals was relevant to the needs of Romania to improve the mobile communication capacities of the MIA structures so they can better perform their part in activities within the national territory related to control of the external borders and enforcing of the Schengen *acquis*.

- The measure was implemented effectively and the equipment is actively used by its intended users (as evidenced by results of the survey carried out in March 2014).
- The efficiency of the investment was verified by the tendering process and the very low unit price for the TETRA terminals (compared to similar investment in Bulgaria). Selection criteria for all contracts was 'lowest price' and there were no contestations. Significant savings compared to the indicative budget were achieved (over 19M EUR). For two contracts only one bidder applied. These contracts accounted for 23% of the investment.
- The impact of the project is verified by statistical data which reflect increased figures of voice and data traffic related to Schengen acquis (implementation (such as acting on hits from the N.SIS or entering and updating alerts).

Description and background

The TETRA infrastructure was developed in Romania utilizing national funds and funds from the Phare Programme. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute TETRA network is part of the Integrated Border Security System of Romania. The Schengen Action Plan for Romania (2007) set up an objective to expand the coverage and usage of the existing TETRA platform, as an important mobile component of the Schengen Information System II.

The Schengen Facility measure provided end-user terminals (portable, mobile, Pocket PC and fixed) and dispatcher consoles for the MIA structures in 27 counties. The total amount of the investment was 25,803,523 EUR.

The measure was implemented through 4 contracts:

Contract 1.1 (completed 29.06.2009), provided TETRA terminals for MIA structures in Bucharest and Brasov, Constanta, Ialomita, Ilfov and Prahova counties. The following types of terminals were connected to the national TETRA platform:

- hand-held TETRA terminals;
- portable data terminals (Pocket PC);
- fixed TETRA terminals (installed in buildings);
- mobile TETRA terminals (installed on vehicles, motorcycles and helicopters).

The contract also included training for programming and installation of terminals.


Contract 1.2. lot 1 (completed 19.11.2010), provided TETRA terminals for the MIA structures in Alba, Arges, Bacau, Bihor, Bistrita Nasaud, Brasov, Buzau, Calarasi, Cluj, Constanta, Covasna, Dambovita, Galati, Gorj, Harghita, Hunedoara, Ialomita, Iasi, Ilfov, Mures, Neamt, Prahova, Salaj, Sibiu, Valcea, Vaslui, and Vrancea counties.

Contract 1.2. lot 2 (completed 02.11.2010), provided TETRA dispatch consoles in buildings of MIA structures located in Alba, Arges, Bacau, Bihor, Bistrita Nasaud, Brasov, Buzau, Calarasi, Cluj, Constanta, Covasna, Dambovita, Galati, Gorj, Harghita, Hunedoara, Ialomita, Iasi, Ilfov, Mures, Neamt, Prahova, Salaj, Sibiu, Valcea, Vaslui and Vrancea counties.

Contract 1.3 (completed 01.06.2010) provided IT equipment for project management, TETRA tester and training.

Prior to the Schengen Facility investment, the Romanian Police was connected to the TETRA network in only three counties, Vaslui, Iasi and Galati (financed by a 2004 PHARE project). The goal of the measure was to provide to MIA structures digital radio terminals for secure communications, including access to the N.SIS. The investment covered both large cities and small towns and rural areas in 27 counties (out of 41 counties in the country). The selection of the 27 counties was based on the availability of good TETRA infrastructure, and at the same time avoided overlapping with existing national programs for TETRA development. Dispatcher consoles were supplied both to the Romanian Police and the Gendarmerie (one console for each per county). The following map shows the counties where MIA structures had TETRA terminals before the implementation of the Schengen Facility measure:

Figure 18: Counties with TETRA terminals for MIA structures before SF measure



Source: General Directorate of Communications and IT, MIA

The counties shaded in grey had reliable TETRA coverage but the MIA structures in those counties had no TETRA terminals. The three counties shaded in yellow had a limited number of terminals before, and they were included in the Schengen Facility measure as well. For instance, the Romanian Police in the Galati County received about 100 terminals from a PHARE project and over 1000 terminals from the Schengen Facility investment. The MIA structures in the counties shaded in green have or are planned to have TETRA coverage and TETRA terminals financed by national funds.

The map below shows which counties received TETRA terminals through the 2004 PHARE project and which from the Schengen Facility investment.

Figure 19: Counties with TETRA terminals for the Romanian Police from 2004 Phare project and from the Schengen Facility

Counties with TETRA terminals from 2004 PHARE project

Counties with TETRA terminals from the Schengen Facility



Source: General Directorate of Communications and IT, MIA

Relevance

The investment contributed to the enhancement of the Integrated Border Security System, by providing reliable and secure voice and data communication devices to units of the MIA structures in border counties and inside the national territory (forth filter of the Border Security System)¹⁴. In our opinion, the link between the investment under this measure and the external borders control is relatively weak but the investment is justified as relevant to the Schengen area accession requirements as far as it enhanced the cooperation between authorities operating directly at the borders and authorities operating within the national territory. In particular, the TETRA equipment acquired under the measure enabled structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to access and interact with the Schengen Information System.

The investment in TETRA radio terminals was in direct response to the following government decisions and strategies:

The *Romanian Government Decision 324/28 March 2007*, for approval of a National Strategy for the Integrated Management of the State Border for 2007-2010 called for the adoption of an *Action Plan* and *Unique Multi Annual Plan* for Investments in the area of border security. The Action Plan envisaged the implementation, upgrade and interconnection, as appropriate, of IT&C systems, "including the acquisition of TETRA terminals and necessary accessories"¹⁵.

The Unique Multi Annual Plan also included a provision for acquisition of TETRA terminals for the Romanian Ministry of Interior structures, related with the completion of the implementation of the Romanian TETRA platform¹⁶.

The Schengen Action Plan, updated in 2008 (Government strategic plan for preparing – from technical point of view – of Romania for admission to the Schengen space) also mentioned the "acquisition of TETRA terminals for the Romanian MIA structures", related to the full implementation of the Romanian TETRA platform¹⁷.

¹⁴ ***The Programme for the Implementation of the National Strategy of Integrated Management of Romania's State Border, for the period 2004 - 2006***

¹⁵ Action Plan, Action 4 ("Filter IV - Activities that take place in the internal national territory") Objective IV.2

¹⁶ Unique Multi Annual Plan for Investments in the area of border security for 2007-2010, Chapter 5 (investments) – Mobile Radio communications Subsystem, Investment No. 55

¹⁷ Schengen Action Plan (2008) Chapter IX – Schengen Information System – Administrative/technical actions - Action 7

Effectiveness

The Project was implemented through 4 contracts:

Contract 1.1 (completed 29.06.2009), provided TETRA terminals for MIA structures in Bucharest and Brasov, Constanta, Ialomita, Ilfov and Prahova counties. The following types of terminals were connected to the national TETRA platform:

- hand-held TETRA terminals;
- portable data terminals (Pocket PC);
- fixed TETRA terminals (installed in buildings);
- mobile TETRA terminals (installed on vehicles, motorcycles and helicopters).

The contract also included training for programming and installation of terminals.

Contract 1.2. lot 1 (completed 19.11.2010), provided TETRA terminals for the MIA structures in Alba, Arges, Bacau, Bihor, Bistrita Nasaud, Brasov, Buzau, Calarasi, Cluj, Constanta, Covasna, Dambovita, Galati, Gorj, Harghita, Hunedoara, Ialomita, Iasi, Ilfov, Mures, Neamt, Prahova, Salaj, Sibiu, Valcea, Vaslui, and Vrancea counties.

Contract 1.2. lot 2 (completed 02.11.2010), provided TETRA dispatch consoles in buildings of MIA structures located in Alba, Arges, Bacau, Bihor, Bistrita Nasaud, Brasov, Buzau, Calarasi, Cluj, Constanta, Covasna, Dambovita, Galati, Gorj, Harghita, Hunedoara, Ialomita, Iasi, Ilfov, Mures, Neamt, Prahova, Salaj, Sibiu, Valcea, Vaslui and Vrancea counties.

Contract 1.3 (completed 01.06.2010) provided IT equipment for project management, TETRA tester and training.

Per interviews with experts from the Directorate for Communications and IT within MIA (held on 24 February 2014), all equipment acquired through the measure was completely functional and operational by the date of the Provisory Certificate for Acceptance for each contract.

Experts at the GDCIT within MIA explained that the TETRA terminals acquired through the measure were checked following a 3-step procedure: 1) quantitative check; 2) functional test at the TETRA programming centre in Bucharest; 3) functional test in the location of destination, immediately after installation of the terminals (applicable to the mobile and fixed TETRA terminals, installed respectively on vehicles and in buildings). For each test level a specific certificate was issued ("process-verbal") that confirmed the complete operating status of the equipment.

All TETRA terminals were programmed in Bucharest, registered in the national TETRA platform, and then distributed to the end users in 27 counties.

During site visits to the county of Galati and to two rural communes in the county police officers on duty demonstrated their TETRA terminals. They indicated the coverage was good throughout the county (pointing out that Galati is quite flat, so there were no blind spots in their areas of control). The police officers in both rural locations (with population of about 3-4 thousand people each) were equipped with portable terminals for each police officer, one stationary terminal and one pocket PC terminal (used for connection to the N.SIS). **A demonstration of a check in the N.SIS was successful**, including downloading of pictures.

An interviewee at the Galati county police mentioned that the patrol cars were equipped with mobile TETRA terminals, but the old analogue, VHF handsets were still in use. The use of TETRA or analog handsets depends on technical compatibility. (At both rural communities that were visited, however, police officers claimed they were using only TETRA terminals.)

Efficiency

The technical specifications for TETRA terminals referred the open TETRA ETSI standard, ensuring a large participation for all producers. All major TETRA terminals producers, EADS, Motorola and Sepura, were represented in the tender procedures. There were 4 tenders for this measure. For the end-user terminals (contracts 1.1 and 1.2 Lot 1) there were respectively 4 and 2 bidders. In case of contract 1.1 (end-user terminals) one bidder was disqualified for not meeting the technical capacity requirements (lack of ISO certificate). Thanks to the **intense competition** and the large quantity of terminals tendered (about 45,000), in case of both tenders, **the winning bids were significantly below the indicative budget**, resulting in savings of over 19M EUR. The effective average price per terminal came to about 440 EUR (including installation and training). Thus, it can be concluded that the investment for TETRA terminals was spent efficiently, as competition was secured during the tendering process and the criteria was 'lowest price'. There were no contestations from the bidders on any of the tenders.

It should be noted though that for two of the contracts, the one for dispatcher consoles and the one for the project management, there was one single bidder, and that the bids were almost equal to the indicative budget. The combined value of the two contracts was 6.0M EUR, or 23% of the investment under the measure. Per comments from the Communications and IT Directorate of MIA for these two contracts, estimations were very close to the market price of the equipment and the quantities were very small relative to the other two contracts, so there were no volume discounts. A major part of one of the contract was the TETRA tester, a highly specialized piece of equipment.

The table below summarizes the main parameters of the tenders, showing the number of bidders, the indicative budget and the winning bid for each of the 4 contracts:

Table 30: Tender Procedures for TETRA Contracts

Contract	Bidders (winner in bold)	Indicative budget (EUR)	Contract Value (EUR)
1.1	4 bidders: EADS Secure Networks; Omnilogic S.R.L.; Motorola Israel; American International Radio/ AGEXIMCO S.R.L.	12,900,000	7,560,428
1.2 Lot 1	2 bidders: Motorola Israel; Consortium Nokia Siemens Networks OY and S.C. Rokura S.R.L.	26,200,000	12,249,000
1.2 Lot 2	1 bidder: Centrul pentru Servicii de Radiocomunicatii S.R.L.	5,900,000	5,896,000
1.3	1 bidder: Centrul pentru Servicii de Radiocomunicatii S.R.L.	100,000	98,096

Source: CFCU Romania

Compared to unit price of TETRA terminals acquired under the Schengen Facility in Bulgaria, the average price achieved in the tender procedures in Romania was about two times lower. One factor was probably the much higher number of terminals acquired (45,000 in Romania vs. 4,057 in Bulgaria).

Complementarity

Most of the TETRA radio infrastructure needed to provide services to Schengen Facility terminals was implemented using national budget funds. In three eastern external border counties (Vaslui, Galati and Iasi) the TETRA radio infrastructure was implemented with financing from the PHARE Programme in 2004.

TETRA system coverage improvements projects have been implemented by national budget funds.

Sustainability

Maintenance

Per interviews and surveys of end users, the TETRA **terminals acquired under the measure caused very few maintenance problems and did not present a financial burden on the units where they were allocated.** Out of a total of 45,000 terminals, only 7 were found faulty and in need of replacement. No post-warranty maintenance contracts have been signed, as the number of required repairs did not justify such contracts. When necessary, terminals were repaired utilizing internal sources of the Directorate of Communication and IT within MIA.

The post-warranty maintenance of the TETRA terminals is regulated with a directive from the Directorate of Communications and IT (Directive No. 602541/16.11.2009, with later modifications). Three levels of repair needs have been specified. Level 1 repairs involve diagnostics and software maintenance of the terminal and is performed by experts of MIA at the headquarters in Bucharest. Level 2 and level 3 repairs (involving replacement of parts of the terminal or of the entire terminal) are handled by the local units. If level 2 or 3 of maintenance is needed, the encryption keys are completely erased and TETRA terminal is sent back to the end-user who initiates a public acquisition for repair service. This organizational framework ensures that local units are allocated budgets for the estimated costs of maintenance and repair. Estimations are based on the needs in previous years.

- Interviewees at the Galati county police stated that out of 1200 terminals in the county, they had 2 broken ones during the warranty period, and another two after the warranty had expired. For the repair of the latter two, they paid from their local budget. The post-warranty service was provided by the same company in Bucharest which serviced the terminals in the warranty period. The management of the county police believed no extra terminals were needed for the normal operation of the police units.
- End-users who were interviewed in Galati County reported they did not experience problems with the terminals' batteries, as these could last for 8-9 hours.

Training

Per data provided by the DCIT within MIA, the contracts awarded within the measure included train-the-trainers modules in the following domains:

- programming of TETRA terminals
- installing of mobile and fixed TETRA terminals
- operating of TETRA dispatch consoles
- operating of TETRA voice loggers
- operating of TETRA tester

Interviewees at the DCIT explained that on-going training for operating TETRA terminals takes place in several locations and includes 100% of the end-users. The training takes place in one of these locations:

- MIA's educational centres, in the framework of technical preparations of new police officers;
- each MIA local territorial unit (training provided by the respective IT&C service personnel in each county);
- Schengen Preparation Multifunction Centre (by means of relevant curricula administered by DCIT). Instruction on the use of TETRA terminals is part of the initial training for all new employees at the Romanian Police and other MIA structures.
- Each officer is trained on the spot when he/she receives the terminal. (Per interviews in Galati county police).
- All employees pass occasional testing on the use of TETRA terminals (per interviews with management of the Galati county police).

In the survey of end users of TETRA terminals, 100% of the respondents reported they received training on the use and maintenance of their terminal.

Impact

The acquisition of TETRA terminals had 2 major impacts:


- police officers obtained secure communication channel, in particular for checks in the N.SIS;
- reaction capabilities of the Romanian Police in 6 border counties and within the country increased thanks to a wider coverage and enhanced capacity for information exchange.

The direct impact of the acquired equipment was operationalizing of the mobile component to access the N.SIS. In fact, N.SIS was completed in parallel with TETRA terminal acquisitions and at the end of Schengen Facility all end-users with access rights to SIS were able to access, in the field, the data they needed using a secure digital radio network. **The old, analogue VHF radio system did not provide the required security for work with sensitive data.**

Measurable indicators at the TETRA system level (e.g. encrypted voice/data traffic statistical indicators) show a **significant increase in the volume of calls after the Schengen Facility terminals became operational.**

Per data provided by the Romanian GDCIT, for the period March 2009 - April 2010 (when terminals acquired under contract 1.1 became operational), the number of Schengen acquis related voice calls recorded on the TETRA platform has grown by approximately 300%.


Figure 20: Usage growth after TETRA terminals acquisition (2009-2010)



Source: General Directorate of Communications and IT, MIA

After all TETRA terminals delivered in contract 1.2, Lot 1 and mobile applications were connected to the platform, data for the period March 2012 - April 2013 indicate the number of voice calls recorded on the TETRA platform increased by approximately 400%. For the same period, the number of data calls also climbed by approximately 400%. All voice and data calls were related to Schengen acquis, per comments from the Romanian GDCIT.

Figure 21: Usage growth after TETRA terminals acquisition (2012-2013)



Source: General Directorate of Communications and IT, MIA

During interviews at the Galati County police inspectorate officers mentioned the following impact from the acquisition of TETRA terminals:

- In Galati county, 1200 TETRA terminals were distributed through Schengen Facility;
- They use the integrated platform with NISA, Interpol, vehicle database, etc. called Interpol. TETRA terminals are used to query the Interpol platform and get alerts from all the integrated databases. The Romanian Police work closely with the Border Police on hits.
- Annually Galati Police has 20-30 cases involving information from SIS II or Interpol.

- With the help of TETRA terminals check are performed easier and faster. Thanks to data features enabled on the terminals, photos can be retrieved from the databases to facilitate the identification of persons.
- The durability of the TETRAs is very good: only two terminals experienced problems during the warranty period. The two TETRAs had been sent to Bucharest for repairs. The Galati Police Inspectorate has 10 terminals for reserve. As of 2014, no additional TETRA terminals were needed.
- 2 persons from Galati Police Inspectorate participated in Bucharest to a training of trainers on how to configure and install fixed or mobile TETRA terminals.

At site visits in Galati and the rural communes of Schela and Sendreni, end-users indicated they used the stationary TETRA terminals on a daily basis. They accessed N.SIS to make checks on persons, cars checked on the road, and stolen objects. It was mentioned that before they obtained access to N.SIS, police officers could not get information about the criminal records of Romanian citizens who had been sought for crimes committed abroad, or getting such information was too slow.

Surveys of end users in all 27 counties which benefited from the measure provided the following key results:

- Added value of Schengen investment: for 100% of the respondents, the TETRA terminal acquired through the measure was the first TETRA terminal (not a replacement of an older terminal);
- 100% of the respondents claimed their TETRA terminal met completely their communication needs in fulfilling their daily work, with regards to Schengen duties (consulting N.SIS II, direct or by voice call to TETRA dispatcher and operative communication related to border protection - 4th filter);
- asked how often they use their TETRA terminal to access N.SIS or NISA, 54% of the respondents (out of a total of 150 respondents) reported they used it on a daily basis, and 46% reported they used it several times a week;
- The two most frequently used features of the TETRA terminals (which were not available previously with the old analogue radios) were encrypted voice communications (mentioned by 95% of the respondents) and database queries (95%), followed by wide area voice/data communications (84%) and encrypted data communications (81%);
- Asked how their work and work conditions changed after the acquisition of the TETRA terminals, 87% responded that they became more efficient in their work; that they felt more secure in performing their duties; and that now they can perform new tasks which were impossible to accomplish with the old equipment.

RO 5 - NATIONAL IT SYSTEM FOR ALERTS (NISA): Objective 2, Measure 1

Key Findings

- The development of the National Information System for Alerts (NISA) and the construction of the National SIS Centre in Bucharest addressed the need for a secure platform for exchange of information among critical public security institutions within Romania and between Romania and the central SIS II.
- Operational data provided on the usage of NISA suggest all authorised institutions have been accessing NISA to make queries and to enter alerts.
- The investment under this measure may be qualified as efficient, as they resulted in savings compared to the allocated budget and despite the large number of disqualified bidders, the winning bids were close to the lowest compliant submitted bid. Savings in operational costs were also achieved. The investment is sustainable, as maintenance for recurring costs is secured by national funds, while the broadband radio network equipment is still covered by a 7-year warranty. Training of personnel has been carried out on a regular basis after the end of the Schengen Facility.
- Broadband access to NISA was provided to 2,856 rural communes with about 3,600 public entities authorised to access NISA, providing coverage to over 80% of the national territory.

List of data collection sources

Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, including technical specifications, decisions of the tender selection commission; contracts and correspondence between the beneficiary and the companies awarded contracts; comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; mission reports by the EC; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government.
Interviews	Head of the National SIS Centre, 2 heads of units and 3 experts at the NSIS Centre (MIA); Head of Radio Communications Dept. at the Special Telecommunications Services (STS); Manager at General Directorate for Communications and IT (MIA); Deputy Head of the Galati County police inspectorate; IT Manager of the Galati County police inspectorate; Head of the commune police and 3 officers at the police station in Schela (Galati County); Head of the commune police and 3 officers at the police station in Sendreni (Galati County).
Site visits	24 February 2014 - National SIS Centre (Bucharest); 24 February 2014 - Headquarters of STS (Bucharest); 24 February 2014 - General Directorate of Communications and IT of

	<p>the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Bucharest);</p> <p>1 April 2014 - Galati County police inspectorate;</p> <p>1 April 2014 - Schela commune police station;</p> <p>1 April 2014 - Sendreni commune police station.</p>
Survey	The survey was distributed to heads or deputy heads of rural and small town police stations which connected to NISA through the broadband WAN financed by the Schengen Facility project RO FSCH 21. Overall, 216 surveys were returned from 37 counties.
Key indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational data on connection to and use of NISA by competent authorities • Number of counties (% of national territory) connected to and using NISA • Improved connectivity and increased use of SIS II through NISA • Competitive tendering procedures • Maintenance and training of end users of NISA

Description and background

This case study covers two separate projects implemented under the Schengen Facility:

- The first project, 'Roll-out of National IT System for Alerts,' combined various national data bases into a single system, compatible with the technical requirements of SIS II. It also included the construction of a building for the National SIS Centre in Bucharest with all necessary equipment and software. The project was implemented by the General Directorate for Communications and IT (MIA).
- The second project, 'Broadband Radio Access to NISA for Rural Area Public Authorities,' was an infrastructure project designed to provide broadband WAN¹⁸ connectivity to institutions in rural areas which are authorised to access NISA. This project was implemented by the Special Telecommunication Service (STS)¹⁹.

NISA is a multifunctional system designed to support border control, issuing of passports, visas and residence permits, vehicle control, customs and other types of control.

The following public authorities in Romania are entitled to interact with NISA:

- Romanian Police
- Romanian Border Police


¹⁸ WAN is a computer networking technology used to transmit data over long distances, and between different Local Area Networks (LANs) or other localised computer networking architectures. Often this is done using leased telecommunications lines. (Wikipedia)

¹⁹ The activity of the Special Telecommunications Service is organized and coordinated by the Supreme Council of National Defence and is placed under the control of the Romanian Parliament, through the Defence, Law Enforcement and National Security Commissions in the two Chambers of Parliament. The institution has a military organization and is part of the national defence system.

- Romanian Gendarmerie
- SIRENE Office
- Romanian Immigration Office
- National Inspectorate for Personal Records
- General Directorate of Passports
- Directorate for Drivers Licenses and Vehicles Registration
- National Customs Authority
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Justice

The chart below illustrates the relationship between the various national data bases linked to NISA, and the interaction of NISA with the N.SIS II and the central SIS II.

Figure 22: NISA in the N.SIS II Architecture



Source: National SIS Centre, Romania

The second project, Broadband Radio Access to NISA for rural communes, provided secure broadband WAN connection to the national integrated network owned by the Special Telecommunications Service. The extension of the national integrated network to the municipalities was carried out by another Schengen Facility project (RO FSCH 15, 'Extension and consolidation of the WAN-ATM communication infrastructure of STS to the town level'). The number of towns reached by this project was 273. The extension to rural communes was dependent on the successful completion of the town-level extension. The rural component connected 2856 rural communes with about 3600 end users from public entities authorised to access NISA. It was complemented by the Schengen Facility project RO-FSCH 3.1, related to the expansion of the Data-Voice Integrated Communication Network (DVCN) of Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform (MIAR).

Relevance

The measure was relevant to the needs of Romania as defined in the Schengen Facility Indicative Programme 2007-2009 (Art.32 of the Accession Treaty 2005). In particular, it addressed the need to create a single, national interface to the SIS II, and to enable public authorities throughout the country to exchange information related to the external border security through a fast and secure connection. The measure was

relevant because it enhanced the compatibility of the IT systems of all public bodies in charge of public order and national security, and contributed to the completion of a joint communication infrastructure. The exchange of information and the cooperation between these public bodies is a key component of the Integrated Border Security System.

In our opinion, the link between the investment under this measure and the external borders control is relatively weak but the investment is justified as relevant to the Schengen area accession requirements as far as it enhanced the cooperation between authorities operating directly at the borders and authorities operating within the national territory. In particular, the access to NISA for rural communes enabled structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to access and interact with the Schengen Information System.

Effectiveness

The measures were effective as they achieved the objectives outlined in the Indicative Programme:

- The National Information System for Alerts (NISA) was launched in November 2010. It passed the internal technical evaluation in the SIS/SIRENE domain. All public institutions authorized to access NISA were able to make queries and enter alerts into SIS.
- The National SIS Centre was built and started operations in March 2010. The organization has a work force of 54 employees (IT experts, project management and administrative staff).
- The rural component of the STS integrated communication network was implemented, reaching over 2800 rural communes and providing access to NISA in over 80% of the national territory of Romania.

The National Information System for Alerts (NISA)

The NISA was implemented through one contract with a value of 9,791,828 EUR.

The initial plan for N.SIS was to connect the national databases to SIS II. However, as SIS II was not operational at the time the N.SIS had to be completed, the developers of N.SIS had to provide connectivity both to SIS I (through SISone4All) and later to SIS II.

The contract included the delivery of IT software application for the implementation of SIS national copy. It also ensured the connection to SIS central system. As part of the contract, 2000 locations throughout the country were connected to NISA²⁰.

The connection to NISA is provided by both fixed and mobile infrastructures, partially financed by the Schengen Facility. The Voice and Data Integrated Communications Network of the MAI was financed by both national and Schengen Facility funds. In particular, Schengen Facility projects, 'Extension of Data-Voice Integrated Communication Network (DVCN) of MAI' RO FSCH 3, worth 14.9M EUR),, and 'Upgrade of the MAI Bucharest City metropolitan data network for assuring data availability and confidentiality in the National Informatics System for Alerts (NISA)' (RO FSCH 9, worth 2.8M EUR), expanded the network to small town and rural areas and upgraded the Bucharest city metropolitan data network.

The mobile component of the infrastructure used to connect to NISA is based on the TETRA standard. There are over 45,000 portable and mobile TETRA devices in use, equipped²¹ with a unique WAP interface (available to


²⁰ Comprehensive Report on the implementation of actions and the financial execution of the lump sum grant payments under the Schengen part of the Schengen Facility with a statement justifying the expenditure (Article 32 of 2005 Act of Accession)

²¹ **Wireless Application Protocol (WAP)** is a technical standard for accessing information over a mobile wireless network. A WAP browser is a web browser for mobile devices such as mobile phones that uses the protocol. (Wikipedia)

all public authorities with access rights to NISA). NISA queries are made possible from handheld terminals, mobile terminals (in vehicles) and fixed terminals in buildings. The mobile access to NISA was enhanced by a Schengen Facility project (RO FSCH 1), worth 25.8M EUR, which supplied TETRA terminals for the Romanian Police structures in 27 counties.

The following chart shows the path an alert takes which is entered into NISA by an authorized officer:

Figure 23: Incoming Alerts in NISA by End-users of the System



Source: National SIS Centre, Romania

Data provided by the National SIS Centre indicate clearly that NISA is being used by the public institutions the way it is intended. The number of queries in the system and the number of entries (create, update and delete operations) show that there are two institutions which are responsible for the bulk of the traffic. In the case of queries in NISA, the Romanian Border Police accounts for 89% of all queries for the past 3 years since the system has been operational (Table 31).

Table 31: Queries in NISA by Public Institution (October 2010 - March 2014)

Public Institution	Queries
Romanian Border Police	177,121,863
Romanian Police	8,048,001
General Inspectorate for Immigration	6,025,921
Directorate for Driving Licenses and Vehicles Registration Certificates	4,955,528
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,468,214
Romanian Gendarmerie	308,422
National SIRENE	27,166
Directorate for Personal Records	8,382
Passports General Directorate	1,133
National Customs Authority	518
Ministry of Justice	518
Public Ministry	287
Total	197,965,953

Source: National SIS Centre, Romania

Data about input operations in NISA (creation, updating and deletion of alerts) for 2011, 2012 and 2013 show that 6 institutions are entering alerts in the system. The Directorate for Personal Records and Databases Management is by far the most intense user of the system, accounting for 74% of the operations (see Table 32). No data was available on the location of the end users who used the system.

Table 32: Number of Create/Update/Delete Operations in NISA (2011-2013)

Public Institution	2011	2012	2013	2011-2013 Total
Directorate for Personal Record and Databases' Management	459,304	356,796	357,354	1,173,454
Directorate for Driving Licenses and Vehicles Registration Certificates	68,270	57,899	50,491	176,660
Romanian Police	46,121	41,171	38,068	125,360
Passports General Directorate	26,826	18,877	12,684	58,387
General Inspectorate for Immigration	7,619	9,791	5,214	22,624
Romanian Border Police	4,874	4,281	11,733	20,888
Total Create/Update/Delete Operations	613,014	488,815	475,544	1,577,373

Source: National SIS Centre, Romania

The National SIS Centre

The setting up of the National SIS Centre was implemented through one contract with a value of 7,471,787 EUR. The investment consisted of construction of a new building in Bucharest, and creating the Centre as an organizational unit within the MIA. The functions of the National SIS Centre include analysis, development, and testing of the software components of the NISA; monitoring and administrating and security of the NISA, monitoring of the disaster recovery, training and a help-desk service.

At the time of the site visit to the National SIS Centre (24.02.2014), the staff of the Centre consisted of 54 employees.

The building of the National SIS Centre was completed in 2010. It has a total area of 4,602 sq. m. The building has a secured fence, 24x7 guards, a CCTV system and manned access control. Inside the building, security is guaranteed by RFID access cards²², CCTV, movement detection sensors and fire and humidity detection equipment. The building also has an independent power source ensuring continued operation in case of a power failure.

The National SIS Centre hosts the NISA and a back-up system for NISA, communication nodes of the SIS II national copy and communication node for connection with the Central SIS.

The Centre provides engineering support available on call 24x7, and a help-desk serving all national institutions authorized to access NISA.

During the site visit to the National SIS Centre a demonstration was made of the interface for NISA. In a test environment, various queries were made and alerts were created. Security features of the building were also observed.

Access to NISA for Rural Areas

The radio communications system for NISA access was developed in three separate projects implemented by STS – RO FSCH 15, 21 and 22. While projects 15 and 22 were targeted at urban and small town areas, the idea of project 21 was to build upon the network created for small towns and to expand it to cover rural areas.

Initially, the rural areas project was a 'stand-by project', meaning it would be implemented only in case sufficient funds could be provided, through savings from other Schengen Facility projects. As it became clear that such savings would be available, the project was launched in late 2009.

Per interviews carried out at the Special Telecommunications Service in Bucharest (24.02.2014), the decision to build a radio-based WAN was justified by two major reasons: 1) it was very expensive to reach rural areas using leased telecommunication lines or building fibre-optical networks; 2) a radio communications network owned and operated by STS provided a higher degree of reliability and security than leased lines owned by a multitude of operators.


The charts below (Figure 24 and Figure 25) illustrate the way the rural piece of the network is built, utilising both the pre-existing infrastructure (financed by the national budget) and the newly built network for small towns (financed from the Schengen Facility, project RO FSCH 15). Two different technologies were used for the urban and the rural parts of the network. The urban one was built with LMDS²³, a technology providing higher capacity but at a shorter range (up to 5 km), while for the rural part the WiMAX technology was deployed, providing lower capacity but at a much wider range (20-25 km). **This mix of technologies provided best value for the money invested**, as capacity requirements in rural areas, where the density of end users is

²² **Radio-frequency identification (RFID)** is the wireless non-contact use of radio-frequency electromagnetic fields to transfer data. (Wikipedia)

²³ **Local Multipoint Distribution Service (LMDS)** is a broadband wireless access technology originally designed for digital television transmission (DTV). It was conceived as a fixed wireless, point-to-multipoint technology for utilization in the "last mile" (i.e. retail customers). LMDS commonly operates on microwave frequencies across the 26 GHz and 29 GHz bands. (Wikipedia)


much lower, could be well met by the WiMAX technology²⁴. As a result, the objective to reach 75% of the communes in Romania was overachieved and the existing system provides access to NISA for over 80% of communes. Another advantage of the built system is that it secures a high level of redundancy – when an outage occurs, only local users are affected, while other locations are automatically moved to other branches of the network, without loss of connectivity.

Figure 24: Broadband radio system (urban and rural areas)



Source: Special telecommunications Service, Romania

Figure 25: LMDS (urban) and WiMAX (rural) solutions



Source: Special telecommunications Service, Romania

²⁴ **WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access)** is a wireless communications standard designed to provide 30 to 40 megabit-per-second data rates, with the 2011 update providing up to 1 Gbit/s for fixed stations. (Wikipedia)

The major challenge experienced during the construction of the network for rural areas was the tight schedule and the need to co-locate²⁵ equipment at towers owned by various operators, both private and state-owned. At some locations there was not sufficient power supply, so it had to be added separately.

Efficiency

The National Information System for Alerts (NISA)

There was one contract for the development of NISA. **Out of 7 initial bidders, 5 were disqualified.** The reasons for disqualification were failure to meet requirements set up in the tender specifications and incomplete responses to clarifications requested by the selection commission. There were appeals and litigation related to the technical specifications and the first tender procedure held in 2008 was cancelled. At the end, after a series of appeals by all bidders, by a decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, the contract was awarded to Consortium SC INTRAROM SA. The winner had offered the second lowest price among the initial 7 offers. The name of bidders and their financial offers are listed below.

Bidders	Financial Offer
Consortium SC ASESOF INTERNATIONAL SA	9,780,000
Consortium SC INTRAROM SA	9,971,949
Consortium AAM Management Information Consulting LTD	9,990,109
SC ROMSYS SRL	10,478,000
SC HEWLETT PACKARD (ROMANIA) SRL	11,996,000
SC S&T ROMANIA SRL	12,997,900
Consortium ALTEC SA	13,341,824

Source: CFCU Romania

It should be noted that the estimated budget for the development of NISA was 17.9M EUR, and the winning bid was only 56% of the allocated amount. The selection criterion was the most economically advantageous offer, with 51% awarded for technical criteria and 49% for price.

The National SIS Centre

There was one contract for the construction of the National SIS Centre. Out of two bidders, initially both were disqualified due to incomplete documentation and failure to prove required experience. After an appeal, one of the bidders was accepted. Thus, only one financial offer was considered. The winning offer, from SC DE CONSTRUCTII ERBASU, was higher (but by less than 1%). Selection criterion was lowest price. The winning offer, for 7.4M EUR, was 0.7M EUR lower than the allocated budget. The lack of competitive bids makes it difficult to conclude if best value for money was achieved.

Access to NISA for Rural Areas

There were two contracts for the provision of broadband radio access to NISA for rural areas. For the major tender for equipment there were 6 bidders. All bidders had to pass a test to demonstrate their equipment meets the technical specifications. Four of the bidders did not pass the test and were disqualified. There were no complaints, as

²⁵ 'Co-location' refers to placing network equipment of various operators at sites that are owned by one of them, or by other entities, e.g. electric companies or railroad companies. Co-location cost is the rent operators pay to the owner of the site.

all bidders were present at the tests and signed protocols that they accept the results of the testing. The selection criterion was most economically advantageous offer, with 55% based on price, 25% on technical criteria, and 20% on length of the warranty period. The winner was the Consortium MOBILIS S.R.L. The winning bid represented 91% of the allocated budget at the time of the tender. The lowest price bidder, Intrarom, presented a technical offer which was not compliant with the technical specifications.

The names of bidders and their financial offers are listed below.

Bidders	Financial Offer
S.C. INTRAROM S.A.	16,614,440
FELIX TELECOM S.R.L.	23,800,010
S.C. RADCOM S.R.L.	21,490,837
S.C. CENTRUL PENTRU SERVICII DE RADIOCOMUNICATII S.R.L.	24,563,761
S.C. MIRA TELECOM S.R.L.	21,433,600
S.C. MOBILIS S.R.L.	22,864,142

Source: CFCU Romania

Based on the above data, **the investments in the NISA, the National SIS Centre the access to NISA to rural areas may be qualified as efficient**, as they resulted in savings compared to the allocated budget and despite the large number of disqualified bidders, the winning bids were close to the lowest compliant submitted bid.

In the case of the project for access to NISA for rural areas, the disqualifications were carried out through a technical compliance test which was accepted by the bidders and there were no appeals.

Operational efficiency

The operational expenses (recurring funds) incurred by the WiMAX network administered by STS are significantly less compared with the costs to lease communications services and the appropriate security devices and mechanisms for using public telecom networks. The costs of using public networks in rural areas was estimated at more than 10 MEUR per year without VAT, for all the Schengen related authorities, in all the communes of Romania. The Schengen Facility investment resulted in significant savings of operating costs for the network, with current costs of 2.37MEUR per year, or savings of 7.63M in every year after the Schengen Facility investment.

Complementarity

The investment under this measure was complementary to several related investments made both prior to and following the Schengen Facility.

Phare funds were used in a pilot phase for the NISA to secure the development environment and the core of the testing environment for the system. Funding for maintenance of NISA was provided after the Schengen Facility by the External Borders Fund in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The EBF was used to assure the full compatibility of NISA with the central SIS II, and also for post-warranty maintenance of the IT infrastructure, including hardware and commercial software.

Sustainability

Maintenance

In addition to funds from the EBF, the maintenance expenses of the National SIS Centre are covered by the national budget.

The broadband radio network is managed and maintained by STS and requires recurring funds. These funds are secured from the national budget and cover costs like co-location rent, power supply and network operation & maintenance. The equipment is still covered by warranty, as warranty was one of the technical requirements for the tender and the winning bidder offered a 7-year warranty contract.

Training

Training for employees of the National SIS Centre and for trainers in the public institutions authorised to access NISA has been financed by the Schengen Facility and by the External Borders Fund. The training provided by the SIS National Centre was addressed to technical administrative staff of N.SIS II and national authorities and for the trainers of end users. End users were then trained at the national authorities with access to NISA.

Per data provided by the National SIS Centre, the following training workshops have been carried out:

Year of training	Contract/Fund	Workshops	Training Days	Trainees
2010	Contract RO-FSCH 2.1 – Schengen Facility	11	94	142
2012	Contract RO-EBF No.2 – External Borders Fund	4	13	40
2013	Contract RO-EBF No.2 – External Borders Fund	4	10	42
2013	Contract RO-EBF No.4 – External Borders Fund	5	31	50

Source: National SIS Centre

A survey was distributed to end users of NISA in rural areas. 84% of the respondents (out of a total of 216 respondents) stated that they have received training on how to use NISA, while 7% reported they were not trained, although they needed some training

Figure 26: Training for NISA end users



Source: electronic survey


Impact

The impact of the investment under the three NISA-related projects is evidenced by the inclusion of all public authorities in the exchange of information through queries and entries of alerts in the SIS II (See data from the National SIS Centre in Table 31 and Table 32, and in **Error! Reference source not found.**).

Access to NISA has been extended to remote rural communes, covering over 80% of the national territory. During a site visit to two rural communes in the Galati County (01.04.2014) police officers from the Romanian Police demonstrated their ability to make queries in NISA utilising their desktop computer and their mobile TETRA terminal. However, statistics for all rural communes connected through the Schengen Facility investment was not available from the National SIS Centre, as they could not provide information about the physical location of the users who have accessed the system. Therefore both impact and effectiveness of the use of the system are difficult to assess.

Survey results show that for 94% of the respondent's access to N.SIS was not available before they were connected to NISA. Sixty-nine percent reported they use NISA to access N.SIS on a daily or weekly basis, and another 22% access N.SIS several times per months (See Figure 27):


Figure 27: Frequency of access to N.SIS using NISA



Source: electronic survey

Respondents reported that connection to NISA was generally good, with only 4% reporting significant interruptions, while 60% said the connection was available at all times, and 36% experienced minor interruptions.


Figure 28: Reliability of connection to NISA



Source: electronic survey

The growing number of 'hits' in NISA for the period 2011-2013 are a clear indicator that the system is being used and Romania is participating in the exchange of information with the other users of the Schengen Information System. It should be noted though that the increase comes mainly from 'hits' abroad on Romanian alerts (almost doubled in 2013 compared to 2011), while the number of 'hits' on foreign alerts has remained more or less flat between 2011 and 2013.

Figure 29: Number of 'Hits' in SIS, Romanian and Foreign Alerts (2011-2013)



Source: National SIS Centre

RO 6 – ROMANIAN POLICE IT SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT: Objective 2, Measure 6

Key Findings

- The **measure addressed a critical need of the Romanian Police** for adequate IT resources in terms of end-user hardware and software, servers and back-up system and training.
- Acquired equipment and expertise helped Romanian Police to better perform its role within the Integrated Border Security System through data exchange with the national component of the SIS II.
- Efficiency is difficult to assess, as rigid pre-selection procedures resulted in disqualifying most of the bidders and having tenders where there was no competition (only one financial offer accepted). Due to this fact, the selection criteria of 'lowest price' cannot be viewed as a guarantee that the funds of the Schengen Facility were invested in the most efficient way.
- Site visits and data provided by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police confirmed that the acquired end-user equipment is available and the N.SIS II is accessed on a regular basis by police officers.
- While data provided by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police suggests systematic training has been delivered to all territorial units, visits at the Headquarters in Bucharest and in two rural police stations in the county of Galati revealed that 1) SIS-related courses were not available on the e-learning platform that was developed under the measure; and 2) end-users were not able to access the e-learning platform from their work stations.
- The sustainability of the investment is well secured through the deployment of internal resources for the maintenance of the equipment and the ongoing training of the personnel after the end of the Schengen Facility.
- Operational data for the usage of NISA and N.SIS (number of queries and alerts entered in NISA) suggest that the measure has enabled the Romanian Police to participate in the exchange of information related to protection of the external borders through activities within Romania.

List of data collection sources

Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, including technical specifications, decisions of the tender selection commission; contracts and correspondence between the beneficiary and the companies awarded contracts; comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; mission reports by the EC; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government.
Interviews	Head of Project Implementation Unit at the Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police (Bucharest); IT manager at the Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police (Bucharest); Deputy Head of the

	Galati County police inspectorate; IT Manager of the Galati County police inspectorate; Head of the commune police and 3 officers at the police station in Schela (Galati County); Head of the commune police and 3 officers at the police station in Sendreni (Galati County).
Site visits	Headquarters of the Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police (25/02/2014); General Directorate of Communications and IT of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (24/02/2014); Galati County police inspectorate (01/04/2014); Schela commune police station (01/04/2014); Sendreni commune police station(01/04/2014).
Key indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Connectivity of Romanian Police offices to NISA and N.SIS • Usage of acquired hardware and e-learning platform • Competitive tendering procedures • Maintenance of the equipment and training of its users • Share of N.SIS-related use of the equipment

Description and background

The objective of the measure was to provide both hardware (servers, work stations, printers) and software (applications for compatibility with N.SIS and application licenses for end users) for the needs of the Romanian Police. The emphasis was on police departments in rural areas and small towns, which as a rule had no connectivity to the data bases of the Romanian Police due to lack of basic computer equipment. About 4,000 police offices benefited from the measure, 3,600 in rural and 400 in urban areas. As this measure was based on the fourth filter of the Schengen Catalogue – “activities within the national territory” the counties are not necessarily to be located near the external border. Thanks to the investment, police officers in all counties received access to police databases and to N.SIS. The network of the Romanian Police, SISPOL, was made compatible with the N.SIS. Along with providing the necessary hardware and software to remote police stations in the country, **the investment addressed three important problems of the pre-existing IT system:**

- the system was **not sufficiently secure** and did not meet the requirements as a sub-system of the national SIS;
- the system was **not reliable**, causing downtime and risk of data loss; and
- The system was **not fast enough**, thus not meeting the SIS requirements for speed of the connected sub-systems.

The measure was implemented through 4 contracts which delivered a total of 670 servers (210 servers for the 41 County Police Inspectorate; 450 servers for 109 Municipal Police departments, 221 Town Police departments; and 10 servers for the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police). A total of 5,000 workstations were delivered to county, municipal, town and rural commune²⁶ police stations:

Contract 1, worth 13,777,294 EUR, was targeted at end users in all Romanian counties, providing hardware (servers, PCs, scanners and printers) and software applications. The four lots of the contract included:

²⁶ Commune is the smallest territorial administrative unit in Romania

- Lot 1 – hardware equipment: servers, accessories and software;
- Lot 2 – hardware equipment: PCs, multifunctional devices, ink-jet and laser printers, scanners;
- Lot 3 – software application for the security and IT management of SISPOL (the network of the Romanian Police);
- Lot 4 – upgrades of hardware and software systems - servers and work stations, multifunctional printers and software licenses for basic server and end-user applications.

Contract 2, worth 4,863,045 EUR, created an interconnection by the various systems and databases of the Romanian Police, ensuring their compatibility with NISA and N.SIS and compliance with reliability and redundancy standards. More specifically, the contract included the setting up of a data centre with a back-up system, a Disaster Recovery system and a software system for the stored data management.

Contract 3, worth 1,174,039 EUR, ensured that applications used by the Romanian Police are compatible with NISA and SIS, and developed software for the integration of data and applications and provided an automated gateway.

Contract 4, worth 1,801,200 EUR, provided hardware equipment and an e-learning software platform to be used by all county police inspectorates and 3 police schools. It also included development of training materials for end users of the NISA and N.SIS.

Relevance

The measure was relevant to the needs of Romania as defined in the Schengen Facility Indicative Programme 2007-2009 (Art.32 of the Accession Treaty 2005). In particular, it addressed the need for 'enhancement of the control abilities at the external borders by increasing the capacity for data provision and data access'. The Romanian Police was defined as a critical player in implementing the fourth filter of the Integrated Border Security System, namely 'Further activities inside the Romanian territory'²⁷. The measure was relevant because it met the objectives set out for the fourth filter:

- It modernized and interconnected the IT systems of the Romanian Police;
- It provided adequate human resources through training facilities and training courses.
- It provided the necessary equipment for the effective use of data systems resources, including the N.SIS.

In our opinion, the link between the investment under this measure and the external borders control is relatively weak but the investment is justified as relevant to the Schengen area accession requirements as far as it enhanced the cooperation between authorities operating directly at the borders and authorities operating within the national territory. In particular, it enabled local structures of the Romanian Police in rural areas and small towns to access and interact with the Schengen Information System.

Effectiveness

All activities envisioned under the measure were completed on time and there seemed to be no delays in the implementation of any of the contracts.²⁸ Per data provided by

²⁷ Romanian Indicative Programme 2007-2009 (Art.32 of the Accession Treaty 2005), p.26.

²⁸ *Comprehensive Report on the implementation of Actions and the Financial Execution of the Lump Sum Grant Payments under the Schengen Part of the Schengen Facility with a Statement*

the General Inspectorate of Romanian Police (Decision No.53 of the Ministry of the Interior and administrative Reform), the acquired equipment through the measure (RO FSCH 10) was distributed to all territorial units in Romania.

The **effectiveness of the measure is demonstrated by the ability of the Romanian Police to participate in the exchange of information through the N.SIS**. Data provided by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police indicate that 100% of the national territory is connected to NISA and N.SIS, enabling the Romanian Police to participate in the exchange of information related to protection of the external borders through activities within Romania. **In 2013, the N.SIS was accessed over 3 million times** for queries. Input operations (creation, updating and deleting of alerts) by the Romanian Police amounted to 116,390 incidents.

The effectiveness of the acquired equipment was enhanced by the development of software applications that enabled police officers to access the various databases of the Romanian Police and to interact with N.SIS through a single interface (the interface was demonstrated during site visits to the Galati County).


The effectiveness of the measure was further enhanced by the comprehensive training programme and methodology developed in February 2010 by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police. The programme included topics related to the legal and practical aspects of the Schengen *acquis* applicable to the Romanian Police. Training was designed to take place both at specialised training centres and at the work place (continuing education). The programme started with the evaluation of the expertise level on Schengen *acquis* topics and involved 21,334 police officers. Train-the-trainer modules were then developed, to prepare trainers for the entire work force of the Romanian Police. The e-learning platform (also developed within the measure) contained courses on external borders control and the use of the SIS, prepared by experts from the Romanian International Police Cooperation Centre. The topics included: Border Police cooperation; border surveillance; personal data protection; alerts and queries in the SIS; identity cards and driving licenses issued by Schengen Area Member States; Schengen visas.

Experts from the Romanian Police explained that at the initial stages of the training programme, a very small percentage of the police force utilised the e-learning platform, as trainers were available for face-to-face instruction and clarifications. The e-learning platform served both as a self-learning tool and as an evaluation tool. In 2010, an assessment of senior officers from the territorial units was performed through the e-learning platform, involving 101 officers.

Interviewees at the Galati County Police confirmed that the e-learning platform has been widely used as a tool for annual performance evaluation of employees. The tests contained questions related to the specific work of police officers and the central and local levels, with emphasis on operational aspects.

The figure below shows the distribution of results from an e-learning test in 2010, suggesting a good uptake of the training by participants:

Figure 30: results of testing of officers of the Romanian Police (2010)



Source: Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police, MAI

A site visit on 1 April 2014 in the Galati county police and in two rural police departments confirmed that the police stations were equipped with workstations and were able to access police data bases and to query the National SIS. However, when asked to demonstrate the use of the e-learning platform, police officers who were present at the time of the visit were not able to log in.

Efficiency

The procurement of equipment and software development was carried out through 4 tenders with a total of 8 lots. The criterion for all tenders was 'lowest price' and there were multiple bidders for most of the lots. However, for the 5 highest value contracts (accounting for 87% of the total investment under the measure), only a single financial bid per contract was considered. All other bidders were disqualified for the following reasons:

Contract 1, Lot 1: Out of 4 bidders, 3 were disqualified. Two for not responding to clarification requests and one for not meeting the technical specifications. The winning offer by Logic Computer S.R.L. included the highest price for the tender.

Contract 1, Lot 2: Out of 3 bidders, 2 were disqualified. One for not meeting the technical specifications, and one for failing to submit a required document in original. The winning offer by Powernet Consulting S.R.L. included the highest price.

Contract 1, Lot 3: Out of 6 bidders, 5 were disqualified. One for not meeting the technical specifications, one for incomplete documentation, two for inconclusive responses to requests for clarification, and one for failure to prove relevant experience. Three of the disqualified bidders had offered a lower price than the winning bidder (Powernet Consulting S.R.L.).

Contract 1, Lot 4: Out of 6 bidders, 5 were disqualified. Three for not meeting the technical specifications, one for failure to prove experience, and one for procedural reasons. Three of the disqualified bidders offered a lower price than the winning offer by Softnet Development and Consulting.

Contract 2, for 'Data storage management for compatibility with NISA and N.SIS', received only one offer.

Based on the above data (all obtained from CFCU Romania), **it remains doubtful that the funds were invested in the most efficient way**, as all competing bids were disqualified during the pre-selection process, thus leaving in effect one bidder per contract.

Overall, the tendering procedures resulted in a total contract value of 21.6M EUR, 4.4M lower than the indicative budget for the measure.

The table below summarizes the main parameters of the tenders, showing the number of bidders, the indicative budget and the winning bid for each of the 4 tenders:

Table 33: Results of the tender procedures for Objective 2, Measure 6 (RO SCH 10)

Contract	Bidders (winner in bold)	Indicative budget (EUR)	Contract Value (EUR)
Contract 1, LOT 1 - Servers	4 bidders: Intrarom Romania Forte Business Services Power Net Consulting Logic Computer	4.213.000	3.472.588
Contract 1, LOT 2 - PCs and Printers	3 bidders: On Line Datensysteme Gmbh Logic Computer Power Net Consulting	5.110.500	4.419.240
Contract 1, LOT 3 - Software	6 bidders: UTI International Softwin Omnilogic Power Net Consulting Total Technologies S&T Romania	4.000.000	2.998.500
Contract 1, LOT 4	6 bidders: Materna Gmbh Information & Comm. S.C. Crescendo International UTI International Softnet Development & Consulting Total Technologies S&T Romania	4.026.500	2.887.596
Contract 2 - Data storage	1 bidder: Power Net Consulting	5.000.000	4.863.045
Contract 3 - Applications	1 bidder: SC IBM Romania S.R.L.	1.750.000	1.174.039
Contract 4 - e-learning platform	Lot 1 = 1 bidder, S.C. Power Net Consulting S.R.L. (contract value of 890,560 EUR) Lot 2 - 3 bidders, the winner was S.C. Siemens S.R.L. (contact value of 950,100 EUR)	1.900.000	1.840.660

Source: CFCU Romania

Many of the contracts, in particular contract 2, 3 and 4, addressed specific software development needs and therefore the reasonableness of their prices is hard to estimate. In the contract for hardware, the average price of sets of workstations, printers and scanners is below 900 EUR, which seems in line with prevailing market prices for such equipment.

Complementarity

The project builds on the outcomes of two previous projects: national project RO 02/IB/JH/03, "Technical and legal assistance to set up the National Schengen Information System compatible with the SIS" and Phare 2004, "Fight against organized crime – an inter-institutional approach", supply component.

The investment under this measure complemented several investments financed through the Schengen Facility, implemented by the Special Telecommunications Services and the General Directorate for Communications and IT:

- Access to N.SIS and the National Information System for Alerts was made possible by the Roll-out of National IT System for Alerts (NISA) implementation at the national level (RO-FSCH 2),
- The implementation of the National SIS II (N.SIS II) component in Romania - national copy of SIS II database and providing connectivity to the central system C.SIS (RO-FSCH 13),
- Broadband radio access equipment and subsequent installation & commissioning services, to provide public authorities from rural areas with access to NISA (RO-FSCH 21) and
- Services for installing and making functional broad band radio access equipment for the town and municipal public authorities' access to NISA (RO-FCH 22). The measure provided fixed access to the N.SIS. It was complementary to the Schengen Facility investment in
- TETRA terminals for the Romanian Police (RO-FSCH 1), through which the mobile component of the N.SIS was financed.

Sustainability

Maintenance

While the maintenance of PCs and other IT equipment acquired through the measure is covered by internal resources (IT maintenance experts at central and country levels, and maintenance budget of local police units), the Romanian Police will need to replace outdated and defective equipment in the coming years. Application for upgrading the hardware has been submitted to the Internal Security Fund.

Maintenance at Galati County

Galati county police received 109 work stations which were distributed to local communes, and 19 printers, distributed to municipality police departments. Out of the 109 PCs, at the time of the site visit 3 were being repaired. Repairs were always done on the premises of the police, even when parts of the computers had to be replaced. On average, 4-5 computers in the county need some kind of repair per year. The computers and servers acquired from the Schengen facility investment were still running, but their performance was insufficient. The IT manager shared that if funds were available, more PCs could be purchased for the county police departments, and servers would be replaced with new ones.

Training

Data provided by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police indicates that training of end users of the equipment and applications financed through the measure continued after the end of the Schengen Facility. Use of the Schengen Information System and other Schengen *acquis* related topics are taught at several training facilities of the MIA: the Multifunctional Schengen Training Centre, the School of Police Officers and the Centre for Education and Training of Police.

Data on the overall number of trained officers indicate that the sustainability of the investment is well secured through ongoing training of the personnel:

Table 34: Training of Romanian Police officers on Schengen acquis related topics

Time Period	Number of officers who attended at least one training or evaluation session	Number of hours allocated to training or evaluation
TOTAL 2011	51, 178 (13,037 senior officers and 38,141 policemen)	8,889
TOTAL 2012	3,407 (trained)	
TOTAL 2013	1,991 (trained)	

Source: Inspectorate General of the Romanian Police, MAI

During site visits to two rural communes in the Galati county police officers confirmed that they have been tested on Schengen-related topics on the e-learning platform. The IT manager interviewed in Galati also stated that the e-learning platform has been used for remote testing of police officers.

Impact

The positive impact of the measure is confirmed by the following indicators:

- Police offices in all Romanian counties have been connected to the central police data bases, including to NISA and N.SIS. In the period 2011-2013, 3,358,938 queries have been made and 116,390 input operations (create, update, delete of alerts) have been recorded.
- 100% of the national territory is connected to NISA and N.SIS, enabling the Romanian Police to participate in the exchange of information related to protection of the external borders through activities within Romania.

On the basis of the above indicators it can be claimed that the measure achieved its main objectives: the Romanian Police is connected to the N.SIS and is actively using the system both for queries and for entering of alerts. This also confirms that the software development part of the measure (the connecting of the various systems and databases of the Romanian Police and ensuring their compatibility with NISA and N.SIS), was successfully implemented.

Similar to the investment of TETRA terminals, the investment in PCs and printers had the **unintended impact of providing multi-functional equipment which is being utilised for general tasks performed by the Romanian Police that are not related to the control of the external borders**. No statistics were available regarding the share of Schengen-related usage of the acquired equipment.

The same observation is to be made about the use of the e-learning platform, developed within the measure. While data provided by the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police verify that training has been delivered to the police force in all counties, the e-learning platform seemed to be rarely accessed and was not demonstrated to be a tool for on-going education on Schengen-related topics.

RO 7 - Modernization of the consulates to the Schengen standards: Objective 1, Measures 3 and 4

Key findings

- Under this project (contract value of 39.7M EUR), 73 consulates were modernized to Schengen standards and a training centre in Bucharest was set up for the consular staff.
- The measure was complementary to a range of other measures related to the introduction of the Visa Information System.
- The measure is key to achieving the objectives of the first EU Schengen Catalogue filter: activities in third countries, in countries of origin and transit.
- The investments had an impact in several ways: increased security in consular offices; better and faster service for visa applicants; interconnection with VIS; better working conditions for MoFA staff.
- Due to security requirements, only Romanian companies were allowed to bid in the tenders for the renovation portion of the measure. Efficiency in the case of real estate acquisitions for consular offices is difficult to assess.

Documents reviewed	Tender documentation, including technical specifications, decisions of the tender selection commissions (CFCU and Ministry of Foreign Affairs); comprehensive reports of the beneficiary on implementing the measure; mission reports by the EC; programmes and decisions of the Romanian government; Sample of data from over 150 tender procedures by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the full data on the tender procedures was not available and instead the team requested data on materially significant acquisitions of over €500 000 euros.
Interviews	Experts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest); experts from the Schengen Directorate at MIA.
Site visits	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General of Consular Affairs
Survey	A questionnaire was distributed electronically to 50 Consular offices which were beneficiaries of the Schengen Facility. Of these 31 survey questionnaires were completed and returned
Key indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilisation of the Training Centre in Bucharest • Consular Offices are operational and in compliance with the Schengen Catalogue • Maintenance of offices and training of personnel

Description and background

During the preparation for accession to the Schengen area it was established that there were 130 consular offices within the diplomatic missions and consulates. Financial constraints led to the gradual dilapidation of consular buildings and office equipment. In many countries the communication infrastructure was in poor condition. In 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) started implementing a programme to

modernize the consulates and consular offices within the diplomatic missions in the EU. However, only 1.2M EUR were spent by the MFA in the period from 2004 to 2007. According to the National Schengen Action Plan, the main objective of the modernization under the measure assessed here was to make all Romanian consulates and consular offices within the diplomatic missions in third countries compliant with the requirements of the Schengen Catalogue.

The measure had four subproject areas:

- I. Bring the consular offices in line with Schengen standards through rehabilitation and reconstruction
- II. Purchase the buildings for consular offices headquarters
- III. Establish a new Training Centre for consular staff by purchasing and fully equipping a new building
- IV. Purchase of specific equipment for the consular offices: security containers, explosives detectors, metal detector gates, portable metal detectors and x-ray scanners for luggage; video surveillance, security alarms, intercommunications, IT&C network and telephony; ticketing systems and billboards to assist orderly processing of customers; forged documents detection equipment

Relevance

The investments under this measure aimed to achieve the objectives set in the first of the four filters (tiers) defined in the EU Schengen Catalogue (the others being External Borders Control, Removal and Readmission) – “activities in third countries, in countries of origin and transit”. The main parameters under this tier include:

- Control of documents at consular posts and at carrier companies;
- Detection of false and falsified documents;
- Control on visa application documents.

After the accession of Romania to the EU the annual average number of third country nationals entering the country (with countries of origin outside the Schengen area) reached 2.5 million. The majority of them (1.9 million) came from two neighbouring countries – Moldova and Ukraine.

Romania had 80 Consular Offices outside the Schengen area. Assessments showed that the consular buildings that were either owned or leased by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in poor condition. They did not comply with the Schengen standards, especially as regards the security of the buildings. In most of the cases the premises of the consular services and the diplomatic missions shared the same entrance. In addition, the offices did not comply with basic security requirements – there were no safety glass screens for the counters, no systems for electronic surveillance and the overall protection of buildings was inadequate. Secondly, the location of most consular offices was inconvenient, with difficult access for citizens. The majority of the buildings did not have waiting rooms for the visa applicants.

The measure also addressed the need for qualified staff at consular offices. Prior to the investment under this measure, staff was not adequately trained. The expected accession to the Schengen area required new knowledge on a number of theoretic and legal documents and specialized practical skills. For example, the consular staff had to be familiar with changing visa regulations following Romania’s accession to the EU. Apart from that, they had to be able to work with the Visa Information System (VIS), classified information and documents, improve skills and techniques for interviewing visa applicants and be familiar with responsibilities of visa issuing.

In order to tackle these issues, Romania proposed to allocate the financial resources in three main directions: (1) modernization of 73 consular offices through the purchase of new buildings and rehabilitation of the old ones; (2) purchase of security systems and tools, communication and office equipment; (3) establishment of a Training Centre for Consular Personnel (TCCP), equipped with a simulator of Schengen consular

services. **The proposed three groups of investments were approved by the European Commission**, and were thus deemed relevant under the Schengen Facility.

Effectiveness

The selected consular offices in third countries (73 out of 80) have received support through three types of projects:

- purchasing of buildings for the Consulate Offices;
- rehabilitation of Consulate Offices;
- delivery of furniture and specific equipment for the Consulate Offices: equipment for processing the visa applications, equipment for detecting false documents, IT and software equipment, security equipment, safe boxes for depositing the visa stickers, ticketing electronic systems, metal detection instruments, audio communication systems for the counters.

In addition, the Training Centre for Consular Personnel was established in Bucharest, which required two types of activities - purchasing a building for the training centre and its rehabilitation (including delivery of the necessary furniture and equipment).

According to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the process of selection of investment in consulates was the result of a complex evaluation system. 20 of the 73 consular sites were shortlisted for rehabilitation works (of which 11 were contracted) and 7 were shortlisted for purchase (of which 5 were contracted). The decisions on what equipment each of the 73 consulates will get were based on a weighting system related to the number of visas issued by each Consulate and the needs reported by the consular offices.

The Indicative Programme 2007-2009 envisaged 52M EUR for the modernization of consular offices, of which 39.75M derived from the Schengen Facility. The final evaluation of the measure established that the total actual eligible costs under the Schengen Facility were 21.68M EUR, and the national co-financing - 2.42M EUR.

The reasons why the disbursed financial resources were less than what was initially planned can be categorized into three groups. Firstly, there were unsuccessful attempts to purchase buildings in two countries. Out of the 7 procedures for purchasing buildings 5 were successful. Secondly, there were several unsuccessful tender procedures for rehabilitation. Analysis of tender procedures over 500 000 euros, showed that of the 7 tenders launched in 2009, 5 were contracted and 2 failed; from the 10 that were launched in 2010, 6 were contracted while 4 failed. Thirdly, the tendering process resulted in savings compared to the allocated budgets. According to the analysis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about two thirds of the unused amount of the budget was due to savings and only one third was due to unsuccessful tenders.

One of the possible criteria for evaluating effectiveness is the number of visas issued. This depends on many external factors such as state of the economy, transport and tourist infrastructure in the destination country, but in principle the modernization of consular offices should simplify the visa issuing process. The data of the consular services actually show a tendency for decrease in the number of visas issued in the period 2009-2012 at the offices where the greatest investments were made (-30%)**Error! Reference source not found.**Figure 33. The 2011 Comprehensive

Report²⁹ defines as a good practice the improved process of reviewing visa applications in Moldova. However, the comparison of data for 2012 shows a considerable decrease in the number of visas issued - 25% (See Table 35, rows 12-14).

Another interesting fact is that the considerable investments made in the consular offices in Tbilisi (acquisition of a building for 1,1M EUR) and Shanghai (1,8M EUR) did not reflect an increase in the issuing of visas, with an average of 2-4 visas issued per day (See Table 35 and Table 36).

The analysis of the data also questions the organizational aspects of modernization of the existing consular offices – 9 of the 20 envisaged tender procedures failed, which is almost 50% unsuccessful rate.

Table 35: Visa issued by consular offices which benefited from SF

Consular offices		Visas /2009	Visas/2012
1.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Moscow	8,259	8,850
2.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Cairo	1,793	2,666
3.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Ankara	10,914	5,056
4.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Damascus	1,133	1,045
5.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Tunis	1,046	1,446
6.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Tbilisi	310	667
7.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Doha	181	344
8.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Belgrade	10,608	610
9.	Consulate General of Romania - Odessa	6,581	3,474
10.	Consulate General of Romania - Saint Petersburg	1,149	1,173
11.	Consulate General of Romania - Shanghai	1,276	920
12.	Consulate General of Romania - Cahul	-	3,821
13.	Consulate General of Romania - Balti	-	11,680
14.	Consular Section of the Romanian Embassy - Chisinau	72.341	38.939
Total			

The creation of a Training Centre for Consular Personnel achieved some notable results. The activities of the Training Centre included³⁰:

- Train the Trainers in the Application of the Common Consular Instructions (CCI);
- Preparation of National Visa Instructions in accordance with CCI;
- Visa Management System Training;
- Preparation of Training Manuals;
- Standard procedure for assessment of the visa application according to Schengen requirements, and conditions for granting a visa, as:
 - a. supporting documentation;
 - b. travel insurance;
 - c. verifications procedures on the authenticity of the documents using the RETRO-CHECK and SECURITECH anti-forgery equipment;
 - d. procedures for notification of refusal;
 - e. procedures for destruction of visa sticker;

²⁹ Comprehensive Report on the implementation of actions and the financial execution of the lump sum grant payments under the Schengen part of the Schengen Facility with a statement justifying the expenditure (Article 32 of 2005 Act of Accession), 30 JUNE 2011

³⁰ Comprehensive Report, p.29

f. rules for access in the National Visa Information System and the databases to SIS.

Per data provided by the MoFA, the following training workshops enhanced the qualification of consular officers:

- a) Between late 2008 (foundation of the Training Centre) – March 2011 (opening of the new venue) 13 courses were organized and approximately 300 persons were trained.
- b) After March 2011 (when the new venue opened) – until March 2014, 15 courses were organized and approximately 350 persons were trained. During the mentioned period, the consular training was also offered in an individual format, as it represents a compulsory exercise for all consular personal being posted abroad. Approximately 150 persons were individually trained.
- c) Continuous training of the consular personnel (during the annual leave, spent in Romania) was launched in 2013 within the Training Centre. During July – December 2013, an approximate number of 50 consular officers were trained.

Efficiency

The conclusion regarding the efficiency of the investments varies considerably between the three sets of projects (purchasing of buildings for the Consulate Offices, rehabilitation of Consulate Offices, endowment with furniture and specific equipment). Due to the specific nature of the acquisition and renovation requirements, there are not enough data available to determine whether the investment was made in the most efficient way in each of the third country markets involved.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the first beneficiary in Romania to deploy electronic bidding in the procurement process, providing an opportunity for multiple bids that led to significant savings in the contracting process. **The electronic bidding should be considered a good practice which enhanced the transparency of the procurement process and encouraged competition.**

Acquisition of new buildings

During the interviews carried out for this case study, it was established that there were various reasons for the purchase of 5 buildings for consular offices (see also **Table 36: Acquisition of Buildings for Consular Offices**):

- in Shanghai, the consulate used to be in a rented building, and the owner did not want to extend the contract. In the long-term, buying a new real estate was regarded the most efficient option;
- in Tbilisi, the existing consular building was old and small and the space for consular activities was inadequate and difficult to reconfigure;
- in Moldova, new offices were purchased in the towns of Cahul and Balti because the one in Chisinau was overwhelmed with visa applications. There were periods when 500 to 1000 visa applicants per day waited at that consular office. Cahul and Balti were selected because analysis showed that most applicants came from these regions, and the additional consular offices would cover the Northern and Southern parts of the country respectively;

- in Tunis, before the investment under this measure, there was only a leased building at a location that citizens found difficult to reach.

Table 36: Acquisition of Buildings for Consular Offices

Contract(s) number	Total contracted amount		Total actual eligible costs	
	Schengen Facility	National co-financing	Schengen Facility	National co-financing
RO FSCH 12.II.1 Purchasing property intended as consular office at Tbilisi	1,055,026.84	85,192.75	1,055,026.84	85,192.75
RO FSCH 12.II. 5 - Purchasing property intended as consular office at Shanghai	753,604.41	1,036,004.73	753,604.41	1,036,004.73
RO FSCH 12.II.4 Real estate acquisition for consular office headquarters in Tunis	320,427.81	749,090.90	308,627.34	721,503.99
RO FSCH 12.II.16 Real estate acquisition for consular office headquarters in Cahul	441,049.00	48,951.00	441,049.00	48,951.00
RO FSCH 12.II.17 Real estate acquisition for consular office headquarters in Balti	675,075.00	74,925.00	675,075.00	74,925.00

Source: Evaluation of the Implementation process of the Indicative Plan objectives of the Schengen Facility 2007 – 2009, report by CPD – NTSN CONECT – Pluriconsult Consortium (2010)

The purchase of buildings for 2 consulates (Rabat and New Delhi) did not succeed due to external factors. In Rabat a new building was envisaged, as the old one was very small. However, after all the procedures were completed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Morocco King's Security Advisor advised that placing a consular office in the selected building would pose a security risk, as the building was too close to some royal premises. In New Delhi at the stage of contract closure on the basis of the selected offer, there was a steep depreciation of the Euro (the currency in which the offer was made), relative to the Indian Rupee, which resulted in a decrease of approximately 30% in the offered price in Rupees. Under these circumstances, the owner of the building did not wish to conclude the transaction. In both cases, there was no time to re-launch the tender.

In order to establish the Training Centre for Consular Personnel in Bucharest a new building was purchased for 1.71M EUR from the Schengen Facility. The building was specifically rehabilitated to provide 'a real-size simulation training facility' of a consular office. The tender for Training Centre **was delayed due to a lengthy procedure for finding an adequate building** and the subsequent negotiations. The contract was signed on the last day of the contracting period. As a result, there was no time to organise a tender for the rehabilitation of the building and the costs for the rehabilitation were borne by the MoFA.

Rehabilitation projects

The rehabilitation was conducted in three phases: 1) Architectural design was prepared by a team of in-house architects for each of the locations. This was a cost-efficient but lengthy procedure that involved site visits to numerous locations. The tender procedure then followed in the next two phases (2) Obtaining letters of intent from potential contractors; 3) Submitting of offers by the companies that received

security clearance. The reason for the two-step procedure was the specific security needs of the consulates, including the need for complying with the safety provisions. **Companies participating in the bidding procedure needed to have security clearance, which naturally limited the competition** and the pool from other regular reconstruction projects. Eleven out of the 20 consulates short-listed for rehabilitation works were selected (See Table 37).

- All deliveries were on time; without any complaints from the contracting authority
- All companies provided a 'warranty' for 1 year, they all had to put a financial bank guarantee of 7-10% of the overall amount.

Table 37: Rehabilitation of Consular Offices

Contract(s) number	Total contracted amount		Total actual eligible costs	
	Schengen Facility	National co-financing	Schengen Facility	National co-financing
RO FSCH 12.1.1 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Serbia	75,037.23	6,667.07	75,037.23	6,667.07
RO FSCH 12.1.3 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Russian Federation -Moscow	503,023.22	3,443.98	503,023.22	3,443.98
RO FSCH 12.1.4 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Egypt - Cairo	24,418.58	29,616.78	24,418.58	29,616.78
RO FSCH 12.1.5 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Turkey - Ankara	74,704.37	6,797.23	74,704.37	6,797.23
RO-FSCH 12.I.7 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Syrian Arab Republic	24,554.38	62,394.56	24,554.38	62,394.56
RO-FSCH 12.I.8 Reconfiguration of the General Consulate in St. Petersburg	76,268.90	1,366.24	76,268.90	1,366.24
RO-FSCH 12.I.9 Reconfiguration of the General Consulate in Odessa	123,284.76	1,446.89	123,284.76	1,446.89
RO-FSCH 12.I.17 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Qatar	27,305.16	55,471.58	27,305.16	55,471.58
RO-FSCH 12.I.19 Reconfiguration of the consular section in Georgia	125,715.09	10,237.21	125,715.09	10,237.21
RO-FSCH 12.I.20 Reconfiguration of the general Consulate in Cahul	354,570.52	39,352.95	354,570.52	39,352.95
RO-FSCH 12.I.21 Reconfiguration of the general Consulate in Balti	177,495.04	19,699.76	177,495.04	19,699.76

Source: Evaluation of the Implementation process of the Indicative Plan objectives of the Schengen Facility 2007 – 2009, report by CPD – NTSN CONECT – Pluriconsult Consortium (2010)

The rehabilitation included the construction of separate entrances for applicants and consular staff, electronic supervision, installation of alarm systems, metal detectors and bulletproof glass.

The contracting for rehabilitation of 9 consular offices (Kiev, Dubai, Kuwait, Riyadh, Varset, Alger, Tashkent, Baku and Beijing) was unsuccessful. For two of the cities, Varset (Serbia) and Tashkent (Uzbekistan), there were no letters of intent submitted;

for one of the contracts, the intended offer was not submitted (Baku, although the local company did send a letter of intent and passed the security clearance); for the Alger (Algeria) contract there were more than one letter of intent, but no offers submitted; for the Kuwait contract, the only offer submitted was disqualified. In Kiev and Beijing there were problems in obtaining the necessary approvals for works from national and local authorities.

As a whole, a general factor undermining the efficiency of the measure is the political decision to preserve the 130 consular offices of a country with 6-8 million foreign visitors per year. It would have been most probably more efficient to reduce the number of consular offices and seek partnerships and apply the approach of common consular offices as the Baltic and Scandinavian countries did. A good example of the application of this approach was identified in Tbilisi, where the Benelux countries were interested to share some rooms in the building purchased by the MoFA.

Complementarity

After the Schengen Facility, fifteen consular offices have been rehabilitated with funding from the External Borders Fund. Further plans have been made for rehabilitations with funding from the Internal Security Fund. The project for modernization of the consulates at the Schengen standards also received significant level of national co-financing of €2.4 million.

The investment, under the measure assessed here was done in part to be able to accommodate IT infrastructure needed for the functioning of the national IT system for Visa on-line and the Visa Information System (VIS). In that respect this measure is complementary to a number of VIS related measures that started under the PHARE programme and continued under the Schengen and EBF programmes. They included³¹:

- The 2002 Phare project (Ro 0006.16.06 – “Information system for processing on-line visa requests”) that resulted in the creation of an electronic system for visa processing, compatible with EU standards in the field of Visa Policy. The Phare project led to the creation of a pilot system that included 10 consular offices.
- The system continued to be developed in 2003 (project Phare RO 02/000-586.04.14/D – “Continuation of the implementation of on-line visa system”) in order to include other 59 consular offices.
- The two Phare projects were followed by a national project to connect the rest of the consular offices, leading to the complete implementation of Romania’s Visa On-line system. The project was finalized in July 2006.
- Under the Schengen Facility: RO-FSCH 11 Development of the National Visa Information System (NS-VIS), the equipment for the National Visa Centre, MFA headquarters and 131 buildings for the diplomatic missions purchased for the implementation of the VIS and VISION. In addition, communication System for N/VIS for all 131 consular offices was purchased.

The following project applications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Operational Programme *Development of Administrative Capacity and Competitiveness* should also be seen as an opportunity for ensuring the sustainability and development of the Schengen Facility investments:

- “Setting up an Electronic Diplomatic Archive”;


³¹ Comprehensive Report, p.47 – 49.

- “Monitoring the IT Equipment Purchased through the Schengen Facility”;
- “E-learning Program for MoFA Personnel”.

Sustainability

The key factor in determining the sustainability of the investments under the Schengen Facility is the amount of resources Romania allocates to the maintenance of the consulates and consular offices. The survey distributed amongst the consular staff for this case study showed that new equipment was installed and renovations carried out even after the finalization of the SF projects in 2010 (see Figure 31).

Figure 31: When was your consular office renovated or equipped with new furniture and equipment?




Source: Electronic Survey

For rehabilitation contracts of the buildings which are not property of the Romanian state, it was a prerequisite that the lease contract should be extended for at least 10 years. This approach guaranteed reasonable medium-term sustainability, reflecting the value of investments made into consulate buildings.

It should be noted that state officials are usually cautious in criticizing the decisions of the higher management. Asked whether their consular office was maintained in a satisfactory way after it was renovated/re-equipped with funding from the Schengen Facility, 42% of the respondents, out of a total of 31 respondents in the electronic survey, stated that not all of the needs had been adequately met (see Figure 32).

Figure 32: Maintenance of consular offices after the Schengen Facility renovation



Source: Electronic Survey Sent to Consular Offices


Impact

The in-depth interviews with high-levels diplomats within the Romanian MoFA led to the following conclusions on the impact of the SF investments:

- **Improvement of the security. The modernization of the buildings provided a higher level of security in the consular offices.** The entrances of the consulates and the diplomatic missions are now separate and the security checks on entering have been improved. In the sensitive areas, x-ray detectors and explosive detectors were installed and bulletproof glass at the desks for document submission. This way, the security standards of Schengen catalogue were met. Statistical data on the annual number of security breaches before and after the measure were requested from the MoFA but were not provided. Yet in an interview with a MoFA officer it became clear that there were “less than 1-3 such incidents detected annually” before the measure, making it difficult to have a quantifiable impact after the measure.
- **Speed of visa processing:** the processing of the visa applications accelerated after the investment, which increased the efficiency of the work in the consulates. The main improvement factor was the modern office and communication equipment, installed under the Schengen Facility. The modernization also led to reorganization of the office space that took into account the modern ergonomic standards.
- **Better services:** better conditions were also created in the waiting areas. This provided comfort to the visa applicants and a positive effect on the image of Romania and the European Union.

The survey results show a consensus with regard to the importance of the equipment delivered under the Schengen Facility (see Figure 33):


Figure 33: Relevance of renovation



Source: Electronic Survey Sent to Consular Offices

Moreover, the survey responses indicate that the modernization projects had a positive impact on various aspects of the visa application process: most respondents pointed out that the conditions for applicants have improved, waiting time has been reduced, and the organization of the application submission process has improved (See Figure 34 **Error! Reference source not found.**).


Figure 34: Impact on applicants



Source: Electronic Survey Sent to Consular Offices

The survey confirmed that most of the respondents felt positive about the changes in their work after the modernisation. Eighty-seven percent said they felt better equipped to perform their tasks; and 71% claimed they were more efficient and could perform new tasks at their workplace thanks to the changes funded by the Schengen facility (see Figure 5).

Figure 35: Impact on employees at the consular offices



Source: Electronic Survey